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Introduction
This report presents the findings from an evaluation of the sanction of Housing Benefit (HB) piloted 
in eight local authority areas in England from 1 November 2007 to 31 October 2009. No sanctions 
were used during the pilot period. This report provides details of the background to and aims of the 
sanction and the local contexts of the pilot areas. The report identifies why the sanction was not 
used and the views of stakeholders about the potential use of a sanction. 
Policy and legislation background
The sanction of HB was introduced in the Welfare Reform Act 2007. The sanction was based on 
the concept of challenge and support to encourage individuals to seek help from initiatives such as 
Family Intervention Projects (FIPs)1. 
The sanction could be applied in circumstances where individuals or households has been subject 
to an order of possession on the grounds of anti-social behaviour and subsequently refused to 
engage with an appropriate package of support. The sanction could be applied in tiered stages to a 
subsequent claim for HB from a new address within a designated pilot area. There were limits on the 
extent of a sanction in cases of material hardship and some cases (such as those involving mental 
health problems) were not eligible for sanction. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) issued 
technical guidance on the intended operation of the sanction.
Eight local authorities piloted the sanction of HB: Blackburn with Darwen; Blackpool; Dover; 
Manchester City; New Forest; Newham; South Gloucestershire and Wirral. Each pilot area was 
provided with a modest grant to meet the additional costs of the sanction scheme. 
The research
The research was undertaken by Sheffield Hallam University and the University of York. The aim 
of the research was to evaluate the implementation, operation and impacts of the sanction of 
HB during the two year pilot period in each of the eight pilot local authority areas. The research 
methods included analysis of relevant documentation and interviews, focus groups and 
correspondence with stakeholders in the eight pilot areas. 
Context and policy infrastructures in the pilot areas
The pilot schemes were established in complex housing and governance contexts, with growing 
housing affordability problems and diffuse rented housing provision. Levels and forms of  
anti-social behaviour varied between the pilot areas but addressing anti-social behaviour was a key 
priority in all of the areas. Some of the pilot local authorities were designated TOGETHER or Respect 
1 FIPs offer intensive support to households, based upon a key worker and whole family 
approach. They aim to reduce anti-social behaviour and offending and address a range of risk 
factors and vulnerabilities. There are now over 700 FIPs, or related projects, in England.
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2Action areas2. The use of enforcement mechanisms varied between the pilot areas. Pilot areas had 
appropriate support services available, although there were some concerns about the capacity of 
alcohol and drugs services. 
Each of the pilot areas followed the guidance issued by the DWP in establishing the sanction 
scheme. The pilot areas intended to implement and deliver the scheme in accordance with this 
guidance. It was believed that the schemes could be delivered within pilot areas’ existing anti-social 
behaviour management strategies. 
There were a range of views expressed about the likely effectiveness of the sanction, with 
a consensus that it potentially offered an additional tool to address anti-social behaviour. 
Stakeholders believed that it was the impact of the threat of sanction on individuals’ engagement 
with support, and the provision of this support, that was the key element. It was expected that less 
than ten individuals would be subject to a sanction in each pilot area. This was due to the limited 
numbers of possession cases on the grounds of anti-social behaviour and the propensity  
of individuals to take up intensive support offered to them.
The operation and delivery of the sanction of Housing Benefit
The sanction of HB schemes were publicised through a range of mechanisms in most  
of the pilot areas. In all of the pilot areas during the period of the pilot, increasing emphasis 
was given to early intervention, prevention and intensive support. This meant that post-eviction 
enforcement action such as a sanction of HB (albeit as a mechanism for facilitating the take up of 
support) was increasingly out of step with policy developments and objectives.
No individual was subject to a sanction of HB during the pilot period (1 November 2007 to  
31 October 2009) although a number of individuals were warned directly about the possibility of  
a potential future sanction. 
The reasons why the sanction was not used included a difficulty in identifying eligible cases due 
to the lack of information flow between the courts, the DWP and local sanction pilot scheme 
coordinators. Although there were potentially eligible cases (possession proceedings on the grounds 
of anti-social behaviour), in no case was a subsequent new claim for HB from an address within a 
pilot area identified.
A number of other factors reduced the number of cases meeting the sanction criteria. These 
included: 
•	 the	limited	use	of	anti-social	behaviour	grounds	for	possession;	
•	 the	ineligibility	of	cases	involving	probationary,	introductory	or	demoted	tenancies;	
•	 the	abandonment	of	properties	by	tenants	prior	to	warrants	being	issued;	and	
•	 limited	information	about	the	actions	of	some	social	registered	and	private	landlords.
2 TOGETHER areas were announced in 2004 as part of the TOGETHER national action plan. Ten 
TOGETHER trailblazer areas were established and were provided with additional funding to 
tackle neighbourhood problems, begging and environmental crimes. Fifty Respect Areas were 
announced in 2007 as part of the Respect Action Plan. The areas received additional funding 
to deliver a range of measures, including FIPs.
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3The use and impacts of warnings of a potential sanction of Housing 
Benefit
There was considerable differentiation between pilot areas with regard to the extent to which 
warnings about a potential sanction of HB were issued, the form that this warning took and the 
stage in individual cases where it was deemed appropriate.
It was not possible to disaggregate the independent impact of a warning of a potential future 
sanction of HB on the behaviour and engagement with support of individuals and households. 
Individuals’ responses to the threat of a sanction were similar to their reaction to a final warning  
and the possibility of legal action more generally and it was widely believed that eviction and 
resultant homelessness would have a greater impact. This is supported by (limited) evidence that 
individuals subject to a warning about a sanction could not recall this.
Key findings and conclusions
There were three views expressed about the impacts of individuals being warned about a potential 
future sanction of HB. Some practitioners believed that the warning had no impact as it related to 
action that was too far in the future and involved too many additional steps. Other practitioners 
stated that the warning may have had some impact but that it was not possible to disaggregate 
this from the influence of other factors such as the threat of eviction or the use of an Anti-Social 
Behaviour Order (ASBO). Practitioners in one pilot area strongly believed that warnings about a 
potential future sanction of HB had been instrumental in some households engaging with support 
packages. 
The majority of practitioners expressed disappointment about the operation of the sanction pilot 
and believed that it had not had any real impact. They cited a number of key flaws including the lack 
of communication from the courts and the DWP, the difficulty in tracking households after eviction 
and the limitations of a post-eviction mechanism. However, local practitioners were divided about 
whether a pre-eviction HB sanction would be more effective and appropriate. 
The majority of local practitioners stated that it was not possible to recommend that the sanction  
be rolled out nationally as there had not been any assessment of the actual processes and 
outcomes of applying a sanction. 
Research participants suggested that most individuals already engage with support and this 
engagement was facilitated through the establishment of trust and identifying underlying  
causes of anti-social behaviour rather than future-orientated legal or financial incentives or penalties. 
There is a need for a greater understanding of the complex relationship between support and 
enforcement and the specific role that coercion and sanction may play in facilitating the take up 
of support. The increasing emphasis within the pilot areas on early intervention, intensive support 
and holistic ‘whole family’ approaches, based on working with individuals and households in 
their existing tenancies were more likely to lead to positive sustainable behavioural change in the 
individuals subject to anti-social behaviour interventions. 
Summary
41 Introduction
In September 2007, the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research at Sheffield Hallam 
University and the Centre for Housing Policy at the University of York were commissioned by the 
DWP to undertake an evaluation of the sanction of HB being piloted in eight local authority areas in 
England. 
This report provides an account of the main findings and issues emerging from the evaluation. 
Chapter 2 describes the policy background to the sanction of HB pilot. Chapter 3 provides 
information about the aims of the evaluation and the research methods used. Chapter 4 
summarises the background context and delivery structures developed and established in the eight 
local authority areas at the commencement of the pilot in October 2007. Chapter 5 provides an 
account of the delivery and operation of the sanction of HB pilot until its conclusion on 31 October 
2009. Chapter 6 presents findings on the use and impacts of warnings about the potential use of a 
sanction of HB. Chapter 7 summarises the key findings and conclusions of the research. 
Appendix 1 provides further information about the background housing, anti-social behaviour 
and policy contexts in each of the eight local authority pilot areas. Appendix 2 provides further 
information about the stakeholders interviewed during the research.
Introduction
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a brief summary of the policy and legislation context for the introduction of 
the sanction of HB pilot schemes in October 2007. The chapter describes the national development 
of the sanction pilot scheme and the intended processes for its implementation. The material in the 
chapter is based on government policy and guidance documents and correspondence and further 
information provided by officers at the DWP.
2.2 Policy and legislation context
In January 2006, the Respect Action Plan (Respect Task Force, 2006, p 23) announced that 
consideration was being given to the introduction of HB sanctions as an incentive for those 
individuals engaged in persistent anti-social behaviour to engage with intensive support services 
that were offered to them. This measure formed part of the government’s agenda to tackle anti-
social behaviour. Although the forms of support that the measure would apply to were not specified, 
reference was made to the intensive rehabilitation services provided by FIPs (Respect Task Force, 
undated). The rationales and aims of the pilot were therefore grounded in the concept of challenge 
and support, through which individuals and families would be supported to change their behaviour, 
with sanctions being applied as a mechanism to facilitate the taking up of support amongst families 
and individuals who previously had refused to engage with support offered to them. 
The sanction of HB related to anti-social behaviour was introduced by Section 31 of the Welfare 
Reform Act 2007. This inserts Sections 130B to 130G to the Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992. The supporting secondary legislation is The Housing Benefit (Loss of Benefit) (Pilot 
Scheme) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2202) and The Housing Benefit (Loss of Benefit) (Pilot Scheme) 
(Supplementary) Regulations 2007 (SI 2007/2427). 
The legislation set out the circumstances under which a local authority may sanction HB. The 
circumstances were where:
•	 A	household	received	a	relevant	order	of	possession	related	to	anti-social	behaviour	and	
subsequently leaves the property.
•	 The	household	was	offered	help	and	support	and	refused	to	engage	with	the	help	offered.
•	 The	household	did	not	comply	with	conditions	within	a	written	warning	notice.	
All three of these circumstances had to apply for a sanction to be considered. 
2.3 The sanction pilot process
In 2006, the DWP invited local authorities to pilot the sanction of HB policy. The pilot was operational 
from 1 November 2007 to 31 October 2009. Eight local authorities agreed to pilot the sanction:
•	 Blackburn	with	Darwen	Borough	Council.
•	 Blackpool	Borough	Council.
•	 Dover	District	Council.
Policy background
6•	 Manchester	City	Council.
•	 New	Forest	District	Council.
•	 Newham	London	Borough	Council.
•	 South	Gloucestershire	Council.
•	 Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
The DWP held stakeholder events for the pilot areas and produced written guidance for the pilot 
areas on the operation of the policy and specific guidance on HB issues relating to the sanction 
(DWP, 2007a and 2007b). 
In order for the HB sanction to be imposed, households needed to have been served with a relevant 
Order for Possession. These included an order made under:
•	 Section	84	of	the	Housing	Act	1985	(secure	tenancies)	on	Ground	2	set	out	in	schedule	2	to	that	
Act;
•	 Section	7	of	the	Housing	Act	1988	(assured	tenancies)	on	Ground	14	set	out	in	Schedule	2	to	that	
Act; and
•	 Section	98	of	the	Rent	Act	(1977)	(protected	or	statutory	tenancies)	in	the	circumstances	specified	
in Case 2 in Schedule 15 to that Act. 
The sanction could only be applied in cases where possession orders were made by a court within 
a pilot local authority area and where a subsequent new claim for HB was made (by a member of a 
household subject to a previous relevant possession order) from a new address within a pilot local 
authority area. 
The process envisaged for the implementation of a sanction was as follows:
•	 The	local	court	would	inform	the	DWP	of	relevant	possession	orders	within	the	pilot	local	authority	
areas 
•	 The	DWP	would	receive,	collate	and	retain	central	records	of	anti-social	behaviour	evictions	within	
the designated pilot areas. 
•	 The	DWP	would	run	monthly	scans	of	future	claims	of	HB	against	details	of	members	of	
households evicted for anti-social behaviour. 
•	 Where	a	new	claim	for	HB	was	made	at	a	new	address	within	a	designated	pilot	area	by	a	
member of a household subject to a relevant previous possession order then members of the 
household would be eligible for a potential sanction. 
•	 The	DWP	would	then	inform	the	relevant	designated	local	sanction	co-ordinator.	
•	 The	household	would	be	approached	and	asked	to	take	up	an	appropriate	programme	of	
rehabilitation. Only in cases where this support was deemed not to have been taken up or 
adequately engaged with, would a HB sanction be considered. 
•	 The	sanction	would	be	applied	in	stages	of	a	ten	per	cent	deduction,	20	per	cent	deduction	and	
then full deduction of 100 per cent if the offer of support was not taken up. 
•	 Households	meeting	hardship	criteria	would	be	subject	to	a	maximum	30	per	cent	reduction	and	
some cases, for example those involving serious mental health issues, were not eligible. 
•	 Each	pilot	area	would	decide	on	a	case	by	case	basis	whether	a	sanction	should	be	applied,	
following the guidance from the DWP. 
Policy background
7The DWP provided a modest grant of approximately £10,000 to each pilot area local authority to 
meet the additional expenditure arising from implementing the sanction of HB schemes.
The government stressed that the primary aim of the sanction of HB was to encourage individuals 
and households to engage with the support offered to them and that it was envisaged that a very 
small number of households would actually be subject to a sanction. 
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the aims and objectives of the evaluation research and provides an account 
of, and reflections upon, the research methods used.
The research was conducted by a team of researchers at Sheffield Hallam University and the 
University of York, supported by an advisory panel of three academic experts. The research was 
conducted between September 2007 and November 2009. 
3.2 Research aims and objectives
The aim of the research was to evaluate the implementation, operation and impacts of the sanction 
of HB during the two year pilot period in each of the eight pilot local authority areas. 
The objectives of the research were specifically to:
•	 Monitor	and	gather	information	on	the	implementation	and	scoping	of	the	local	schemes	during	
their initial stages (November 2007 to April 2008).
•	 Capture	and	evaluate	how	each	of	the	pilot	schemes	had	operated	during	the	pilot	period.
•	 Provide	an	in-depth	profile	of	the	households	eligible	for	sanction	(including	those	sanctioned	and	
not sanctioned).
•	 Identify	and	understand	why	households	had	or	had	not	been	sanctioned.
•	 Identify	and	understand	the	housing	outcomes	of	as	many	individuals	and	households	eligible	for	
sanction (including those sanctioned and not sanctioned) as possible. 
3.3 Research methods
The research comprised four waves of fieldwork, as follows:
•	 Initial	Scoping	Phase	(November	2007	to	April	2008).
•	 First	Delivery	Progress	Assessment	(August	2008	to	October	2008).
•	 Second	Delivery	Progress	Assessment	(January	2009	to	April	2009).
•	 Final	Evaluation	(September	2009	to	November	2009).
During each wave of fieldwork the research comprised:
•	 An	analysis	of	relevant	documentation	(including	local	strategies,	practice	and	guidance	
manuals, publicity materials related to the sanction of HB schemes and local progress reports and 
evaluations).
•	 Interviews	(in	person	or	by	telephone)	and/or	focus	groups	and/or	written	responses	with/from	
local sanction pilot coordination and delivery officers and other relevant stakeholders. 
About the research
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anti-social behaviour managers and officers for local authorities and registered social landlords, 
local authority HB managers, officers from local authority Housing, Homelessness, Children’s, Social 
Work and Legal Services departments and managers of local FIPs. Full details of the stakeholders 
interviewed are provided in Appendix 2.
Following each of the four waves of fieldwork, a report was produced, circulated to the eight pilot 
local authority areas for comment and subsequently submitted to the DWP.
Seminar presentations on the interim findings of the evaluation were delivered to the DWP and the 
Scottish Government. 
As there were no households subject to a sanction during the pilot it was not possible to undertake 
three elements of the planned research. These included: 
•	 tracking	outcomes	for	households	eligible	for	a	sanction;	
•	 extending	coverage	of	key	stakeholders	to	legal	and	tenant	representatives	and	Citizens	Advice	
Bureaus; and 
•	 using	non-pilot	control	areas	to	compare	the	take	up	and	outcomes	of	FIPs	support.
As the research progressed and it became evident that it was increasingly unlikely that an individual 
would be subject to a sanction of HB, we additionally focused on the impact and outcomes of the 
use of warnings about a potential sanction on the behaviour of individuals and households subject 
to a warning. We asked key local stakeholders for their views on this issue and these are presented 
in Chapter 6. An attempt was made to identify and interview individuals who had been subject to 
a warning. This was achieved in only one pilot area, where four individuals subject to anti-social 
behaviour interventions were interviewed, between January 2009 and April 2009. 
The limitations of the research methods should be borne in mind when reading this report and when 
considering its findings and conclusions. In particular, the absence of the perspectives of households 
subject to a warning about a potential sanction, other tenants, other registered social landlords and 
representatives of the local courts and the DWP should be noted. In addition, local authorities do not 
necessarily collate up to date and accurate data about the grounds for possession orders and may 
not have an awareness of the legal actions of all registered social and private landlords in their area. 
This should be noted when reading the section of the report which discusses levels of possession 
orders related to anti-social behaviour in the sanction pilot areas. 
The issues of data protection and research ethics are very important. Although it was not directly 
relevant to this evaluation, given that no households were subject to tracking, it is important to 
note that all future research in this area requires the informed consent of participants and key local 
stakeholders were concerned about how information about individuals subject to warnings of actual 
sanctions could be identified to the researchers. 
In order to protect the confidentiality of the research participants, individual quotes presented in this 
report are not attributed to specific stakeholders. 
About the research
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4 Context and policy 
 infrastructures in the pilot 
 areas
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a summary account of the demographic and housing contexts and policy 
infrastructures in the pilot local authority areas at the time when the sanction of HB schemes were 
developed. More details about each of the pilot localities are provided in Appendix 1. The chapter 
also reports on the intended operation, aims and expected outcomes of the sanction schemes at 
the time of their implementation and the issues that were present and emerging during this period. 
The material presented in this chapter is based on the initial fieldwork conducted in each pilot local 
authority area, between November 2007 and March 2008, comprising analysis of key background 
data, strategic policy documents and interviews and focus groups with local stakeholders. 
4.2 Local contexts
The proportions of properties in the social and private rented tenures varied between the pilot areas. 
However, all of the pilot areas had an increasingly diverse rental tenure pattern, combining various 
forms of council or ex-council properties, large numbers of registered social landlords and a private 
rented sector (see Table 4. 1). This was most evident in Manchester, which combined retained 
council stock, an Arms Length Management Organisation, stock transfer organisations, other 
registered social landlords and large numbers of private landlords. This diversity and complexity 
created potential challenges to the operation of the sanction of HB schemes. Most pilot areas 
had seen a growth in the private rented tenure. The Buy to Let sector, the large number of private 
landlords with one or two properties, the increase in Houses in Multiple Occupation and the presence 
of larger syndicate private landlords who may not be based locally suggested that it would be 
very complex and resource intensive to engage the full range of private landlords in the sanction 
schemes. 
Common findings across the pilot areas were that, according to Housing Strategy documents and 
local stakeholders, housing affordability was an increasing problem, that waiting lists for access 
to social housing were growing and that rent levels were rising in the private rented sector in 
many localities within the pilot areas. A large proportion of social and private rented tenants were 
dependent upon HB. This dependency and increasing rent levels enhanced the potential implications 
of the sanction of HB for households. 
The research did not identity any specific issues relating to Black and Minority Ethnic groups and the 
operation of the sanction schemes at this initial stage of their implementation, although Blackburn 
and Darwen, Manchester City and Newham in particular had large Black and Minority Ethnic 
populations.
Context and policy infrastructures in the pilot areas
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Levels of recorded anti-social behaviour and crime varied across the pilot areas. For example, in 
the New Forest and South Gloucestershire levels were significantly below the national or regional 
average. In Blackpool and Manchester levels were above the national or regional average. In all of 
the pilot areas, survey evidence and agency data suggested that crime and anti-social behaviour 
had tended to stabilise or indeed fall since 2001. However, perceptions and concerns about  
anti-social behaviour remain significant in all the pilot areas, particularly related to anti-social 
behaviour involving young people and environmental offences. There was also a consensus that 
incidents related to the misuse of drugs and alcohol were increasing and that these factors were 
increasingly prevalent in cases of homelessness and persistent anti-social behaviour. 
4.3 Local policy infrastructures
A model shared by all the pilot areas was for a multi-agency anti-social behaviour team to sit 
within the framework of the local Community Safety Partnerships. These teams were based in local 
authorities or in a large registered social landlord in some areas where whole stock transfer had 
occurred. The teams comprised anti-social behaviour prevention and enforcement officers, legal 
officers, seconded police officers and parenting practitioners. In most cases, the coordinators of 
these teams were also coordinating the sanction of HB pilot schemes. These central anti-social 
behaviour teams coordinated the initial responses to anti-social behaviour which were usually 
carried out by local housing officers and also dealt with referred serious, persistent or complex cases. 
Large registered social landlords, including stock transfer organisations, had their own anti-social 
behaviour teams, and these landlords had been involved in the development and implementation 
of the sanction of HB pilot schemes. In addition, several of the pilot areas had used signing up to 
the Respect Housing Management Standard as a mechanism for developing closer links between 
local authorities and registered social landlords in developing and delivering anti-social behaviour 
strategies. It was anticipated that these strong partnership structures would enable coordinated 
responses to the pilot sanction schemes, although connections with private landlords were generally 
much weaker. 
All of the sanction pilot areas operated multi-agency panels or case conferences to manage more 
complex or serious cases of anti-social behaviour. These panels included anti-social behaviour 
team officers from local authorities and large registered social landlords, the police, Fire and Rescue 
Services, Youth Offending Teams, parenting practitioners, managers of FIPs and representatives 
from local authority departments including Housing, Homelessness, Children and Young People, 
Community Care, Social Work, Education Welfare and Environmental Services. In some pilot areas an 
authority-wide panel was complemented by a number of local panels. 
Manchester was a TOGETHER trailblazer area. Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Dover and 
Wirral were designated Respect Action areas. All of the pilot areas had similar strategic aims 
and approaches to tackling anti-social behaviour, based upon a holistic model of prevention, 
intervention, education, enforcement and resettlement. However, the extent to which measures 
including ASBOs, Injunctions, Dispersal Orders and Parenting Orders were utilised varied considerably 
between the pilot local authorities. 
It was commonly believed across the pilot areas that appropriate support services were available 
for households involved in anti-social behaviour and that access to the support services likely to 
be required by households eligible for a sanction of HB would be facilitated by strong partnership 
working. However, there was some concern in most pilot areas about the provision and capacity of 
existing drug and alcohol misuse services. The four larger urban authorities all had FIPs. Whilst this 
was not feasible for the smaller rural authorities, all of the pilot areas had given increasing priority 
Context and policy infrastructures in the pilot areas
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to parenting support, through the use of parenting practitioners, often resourced through Respect 
funding. FIPs, where they existed, were expected to be centrally involved in providing support to 
family households meeting the criteria for a sanction of HB.
Table 4.1 below provides a summary of the local contexts for the delivery of the HB sanction scheme 
in the eight pilot local authority areas:
Table 4.1 Summary of local contexts for the Housing Benefit sanction pilots
Pilot area Housing 
management
Area status FIPs HB sanction 
delivery
Blackburn with 
Darwin
Whole Stock Transfer 
(Twin Valley Homes)
Respect Action area Darwen Family 
Intervention 
Programme
Community 
Safety Team Case 
Intervention Panel
Blackpool Arms Length 
Management 
Organisation (ALMO) 
(Blackpool Coastal 
Housing)
Respect Action area Springboard FIPs Blackpool Coastal 
Housing Anti-social 
Behaviour Team
Dover Direct Council 
Management (Dover 
District Council)
Respect Action area Dover Anti-social 
Behaviour Action 
Group
Manchester Direct Council 
Management 
(Manchester City 
Council), ALMO, 
partial stock transfer 
organisations, Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI)
TOGETHER trailblazer 
area
Tenancy Support 
Plus (Manchester 
City Council) and 
Foundations Project 
(NCH and registered 
social landlord)
Anti-social 
Behaviour Panel
New Forest Direct Council 
Management (New 
Forest District Council)
Divided We Fall 
partnership group 
case conferences
Newham ALMO (Newham 
Homes), Tenant 
Management 
Organisations, PFI
Newham Family 
Intervention Project
Newham Crime 
and Anti-social 
Behaviour Service
South 
Gloucestershire
Whole Stock Transfer 
(Merlin Housing 
Society)
Anti-social 
Behaviour Review 
Panel
Wirral Whole stock 
transfer (Wirral 
Partnership Homes 
and Beechwood and 
Ballantyne Community 
Housing Association)
Respect Action area Wirral FIPs Sanctions Panel, 
linked to Anti-social 
Behaviour Team
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4.4 Initial development of the sanction of Housing Benefit
Respondents in all of the pilot areas acknowledged that there had been an opportunity to engage in 
consultation and meetings with the DWP about the implementation of the sanction of HB schemes. 
The general view was that the guidance issued by the DWP, including the specific guidance on 
HB mechanisms, was clear. However, there was some concern that the guidance was issued at a 
relatively late stage and the pilots stated that they would welcome more opportunities to discuss 
developments with, and to learn from, each other.
A small group of practitioners took the lead in developing the sanction schemes in each pilot area. 
These included the designated sanction scheme coordinator (usually the anti-social behaviour or 
community safety team coordinator) and representatives from local authority Housing and HB 
Services representatives from large registered social landlords and FIP managers. 
In the pilot areas mechanisms were established for administering the schemes based upon existing 
procedures and groupings. Although at varying stages, the pilots developed written communication 
materials about the schemes, including publicity and information leaflets, warning letters and 
hardship appeal forms as well as amending generic anti-social behaviour warning letters and tenant 
information documents. 
The pilots informed key stakeholder partners about the schemes. These included registered social 
landlords (particularly those signed up to partnership working with local authorities through the 
Respect Housing Management Standard), support service organisations, some private landlords 
and voluntary organisations including Citizens Advice Bureaus. Mechanisms for publicising the 
scheme included local area panels and landlord forums, housing and benefits newsletters, tenants’ 
newsletters and press releases. However, most pilot areas deliberately sought to limit the publicity 
about the scheme, given its early stages and the need to avoid alarming tenants and landlords. 
However, Wirral conducted a two day ‘road show’ to inform residents and practitioners about the 
scheme and to answer their queries and South Gloucestershire hosted a conference for social and 
private landlords which included sessions about the sanction of HB scheme. 
4.5 The intended operation of the sanction of Housing Benefit
All of the pilot areas intended to base their implementation of the sanction of HB schemes on the 
guidance issued by the DWP. In all but one pilot area, the sanction would be delivered through 
existing structures and procedures, and in the one area (Wirral) where a bespoke sanction panel was 
being used, this was a sub-group comprising members of the existing anti-social behaviour team. 
Stakeholders in one pilot area reported that the development of the sanction scheme had required 
considerable resources. However, in the other pilot areas, it was stated that, as the scheme worked 
within existing structures and was likely to affect a very small number of households, the impacts 
upon resources, including those of HB departments, were anticipated to be minimal after the initial 
set up stage. 
The pilot areas recognised that they would be dependent upon the DWP informing them, through 
the central database, of eligible households. However, anti-social behaviour teams, particularly 
in the smaller local authorities, were likely to be aware of all households subject to eviction 
proceedings related to anti-social behaviour and in most cases, were already working with these 
households. Some of the larger urban local authority pilots, including Manchester and Wirral 
explored the possibility of establishing an additional mechanism whereby they may be directly 
informed by the local courts of evictions in their area. 
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The key vehicles for delivering the sanction of HB schemes were the existing multi-agency 
intervention panels or case conference groups in each pilot area. In addition to their core 
membership, relevant registered social landlords or other stakeholders were to be invited to join 
the panel on a case by case basis. In most cases, the coordinator of these panels was also the 
designated coordinator for the sanction schemes. 
Upon notification by the DWP, the panels would collate information about the individual or 
household and conduct an interview with the individual or members of the household. These 
activities would lead to the production of a pre-assessment report presented to the panel. On the 
basis of this information, the panel would develop an action plan of support to be offered to the 
household. It was anticipated that appropriate support services would be in place and could be 
accessed in the short-term by eligible households (although in one pilot area it was acknowledged 
that eligible households may have to be given priority over others if there were waiting lists for a 
service). 
These panels would also review the engagement of the household with support services and the 
impacts that the support was having upon their behaviour, based on an assessment provided by 
support service workers. It was anticipated in most pilot areas that a designated case worker would 
be assigned to each household. The panels would review engagement on a regular basis and would 
make subsequent decisions about the application, continuation or cessation of a sanction of HB. 
Stakeholders in the pilot areas commonly held the view that tenants should be informed about 
the possibility of sanction at the earliest opportunity (reflected in the publicity activities reported 
above). Some pilot areas intended to refer to the sanction in their tenant handbooks, whilst all the 
pilots would refer to the sanction in the early first stage warning letters that were issued to alleged 
perpetrators of anti-social behaviour. 
There were some differences between the pilot areas in their initial perceptions of how HB 
processes would operate in applying the sanction. Some pilot areas did not identify any problems 
in administering the sanction; although they believed that manual calculations would be required, 
based upon altering the eligible rent level. However, one pilot area reported that their existing 
software package would not enable a partial percentage sanction to be applied.
Clarification was sought from the DWP about a number of issues including: how calculations of 
percentage reductions should be managed in cases where rent increased; whether individuals 
subject to a 100 per cent sanction were to be classified as suspended or sanctioned; how a new 
claim by an individual under sanction at a previous property was to be administered; at what stage 
over-payments should be pursued; and how the hardship appeals process would operate.
All of the pilot areas followed DWP guidance that HB officers would administer the sanction but 
would not be involved in panel decisions about whether or not a sanction was appropriate.
4.6 Aims and expected impacts and outcomes
The commonly expressed view at the outset of sanction pilot period was that it potentially provided 
an additional tool for encouraging households to engage with support services and addressing 
the underlying causes of anti-social behaviour. In this regard, it was viewed as a mechanism for 
complementing preventative approaches rather than a further enforcement measure. It was the 
threat of the sanction, rather than its actual application, that was viewed as being powerful.  
The sanction was also viewed as corresponding with the dual approach of support and compliance 
that was commonly deployed in anti-social behaviour interventions in the pilot areas. 
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In several pilot areas research participants believed that the sanction could act as a catalyst 
for improving multi-agency working and the range and extent of support services provided 
to households. The fact that the sanction schemes required appropriate support services to 
be available was regarded as useful in extending the involvement of support agencies and 
organisations and providing new services as well as facilitating more in depth analysis and responses 
to the complex needs of individual households. Another potential benefit of the sanction was the 
identification of households, particularly in the private rented sector, that were not already known 
to agencies (although it was anticipated that this would be a very small number of households and 
mainly in the larger urban authorities). 
Although of secondary importance, in at least one pilot area the sanction of HB was regarded as 
sending out important symbolic messages to residents that anti-social behaviour would not be 
tolerated and was being tackled by local agencies. 
In all of the pilot areas, a very small proportion of overall cases resulted in legal enforcement action 
and even fewer in evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. It was therefore anticipated 
that very small numbers of households would be eligible for potential sanction. The estimated 
numbers of previous evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour ranged from ten per year in 
the larger urban pilot local authorities to none or one or two in the previous five years in the smaller 
rural local authorities. It was anticipated that the numbers of households meeting the criteria for 
the sanction over the duration of the pilot period was likely to be in single figures in each of the pilot 
areas. 
There were a range of explanatory factors for this, including the emphasis upon, and success of, 
alternative pre-eviction measures including injunctions and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts, the 
increasing use of probationary and demoted tenancies, the reluctance of private landlords and 
some registered social landlords to seek evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour and the 
abandonment of properties prior to eviction, with households moving in with families or friends. 
Significantly, practitioners, including FIPs managers, reported that, in their experience, the vast 
majority of households subject to anti-social behaviour interventions (90 per cent) took up offers of 
support. Therefore it was viewed as being unlikely, even where households met the initial eligibility 
criteria, for it to be necessary to actually apply the sanction. No specific characteristics of individuals 
or households were identified as making them more or less likely to engage with offers of support. 
There were a range of views about the likely effectiveness of the threat of a sanction of HB. Some 
practitioners believed that the threat of the sanction was potentially very powerful and may result 
in households taking up offers of support, particularly as it would be extend post-eviction and into 
the private rented sector. It was also believed that some households initially refused to engage with 
support services, but if this reluctance could be overcome, then these households would increasingly 
participate in the services offered to them. The threat of the sanction of HB was viewed as another 
tool for overcoming this initial barrier to engagement. 
However, other stakeholders believed that the threat of sanction would have limited, if any, impact. 
The reasons for this view included the threat of the sanction being in the future and dependent upon 
household’s subsequent place of residence. It was felt that if the immediate threat of the loss of 
their home was not sufficient to address the behaviour, it was unlikely that a future loss of HB would 
be effective. It was also argued that some individuals would not be overly concerned by accruing 
rent arrears and that in many cases where full HB was paid directly to the landlord, there would 
be no immediate material impact upon the sanctioned tenant. Thirdly, there were concerns that 
some households engaged in serious anti-social behaviour would not understand the longer term 
consequences of their conduct and would therefore be unlikely to respond in a ‘rational’ or ‘logical’ 
manner to the threat of sanction.
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Concerns were expressed, particularly by voluntary sector representatives, about the impact of 
the sanction upon households, including children. Although it was recognised that a hardship 
mechanism was in place, the potential impact of a loss of income on the ability of households 
to purchase essential goods and provisions was identified. There was also a concern that some 
households may resort to borrowing money from high interest ‘loan sharks’. There was a perceived 
lack of clarity about which agencies or organisations would have ultimate responsibility for the 
welfare of sanctioned families. Local authorities were still likely to have statutory obligations, 
particularly towards children, and there was some uncertainty about how homeless intentionality 
related to the sanction. It was argued that there was a need to examine how a subsequent eviction 
from private rented accommodation as a result of rent arrears arising from a sanction would be 
interpreted if a household then presented to a local authority as homeless.
There were some concerns about how the sanction would affect the relationship between local 
authorities and private landlords and to what extent landlords should be informed about the 
scheme. Not informing landlords could potentially damage relationships between them and local 
authorities. Conversely, landlords may become more reluctant to accommodate some households 
if they believed that HB sanctions may be applied. There was also a common belief that registered 
social landlords and local authorities may be reluctant to apply a sanction that led to a loss of their 
own rental income and an increase in their rent arrears figures. 
4.7 Issues
A number of additional issues were identified by key stakeholders during the initial establishment 
phase of the sanction of HB pilot schemes. Concerns were expressed by stakeholders in most pilot 
areas about how the sanction would relate to vulnerable individuals with mental health or learning 
difficulties. However, it was acknowledged that DWP guidance indicated that a sanction was unlikely 
to be appropriate in such circumstances.
There was a division between services provided to family households and single person or couple 
without children households. Households with children were likely to receive support through FIPs 
where these existed, or through parenting practitioners. However, households without children were 
not usually eligible for support through FIPs. Support to single persons or couples without children 
was most likely to be provided through housing tenancy support mechanisms. It was recognised in 
the pilot areas that it was essential that support be available to households without children and 
that, through the anti-social behaviour panels, responses to all households eligible for sanction were 
clearly coordinated. A number of support services, such as alcohol or drug rehabilitation, mediation 
or counselling were not dependent on household composition. 
There were concerns about how ‘appropriate engagement’ by households would be quantified 
and where the responsibility for assessing appropriate engagement would lie. The common view 
was that engagement could not be measured by households simply turning up for parenting 
classes etc. However, it was equally recognised that engagement could fluctuate over time and 
be demonstrated in different ways and that active engagement could not be equated with an 
immediate cessation of problematic behaviour. Across the pilots, the consensus seemed to be that 
households would be given a reasonable period to demonstrate engagement prior to a sanction 
being imposed but also that engagement would have to be demonstrated for a sustained period 
of time. In most pilot areas, it was thought likely that individual case workers or FIP officers would 
make the initial assessment of engagement and this would be reviewed by the panel coordinating 
the sanction scheme.
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Practitioners in several pilot areas expressed their disappointment that the sanction of HB was 
a post-eviction mechanism. They argued that it would be more effective if it could be applied 
at an earlier stage in intervention processes. It was felt that this would enable the sanction to 
complement more fully the emphasis on early intervention and would also reinforce that eviction 
was a measure of last resort that was likely to displace, rather than resolve, anti-social behaviour.
It was also suggested by stakeholders that there was a need to explore the impact of the rolling 
out of the Local Housing Allowance to the private rented sector in England during the period of the 
sanction of HB pilot schemes, given that this would increase the numbers of tenants receiving direct 
payment of HB and potentially making the threat of a sanction more tangible as a result.
Some stakeholders argues that there was a need for the DWP to provide further guidance or 
clarification about how the sanction was to be technically administered by local authority HB 
departments in the pilot areas.
4.8 Summary
In all of the sanction of HB pilot areas, the scheme would be operating in a complex housing and 
governance context, with increasing numbers of landlords, growing housing affordability and access 
problems and a significant dependence upon HB. Levels and forms of anti-social behaviour varied 
between the pilot areas but addressing anti-social behaviour was a key priority in all of the areas. 
All of the pilot areas used multi-agency groups to coordinate strategic responses to anti-social 
behaviour and multi-agency panels to assess the most complex cases. Partnership working was 
strong with registered social landlords but considerably weaker with private landlords. Some of the 
pilot local authorities were designated TOGETHER or Respect Action areas. The use of enforcement 
mechanisms varied between the pilot areas, but increasing emphasis was being given to early 
intervention and intensive support services and there were low levels of eviction on the grounds of 
anti-social behaviour. Pilot areas had appropriate support services available, although there were 
some concerns about the capacity of alcohol and drugs services. 
Each of the pilot areas followed the guidance issued by the DWP about the establishment of 
the sanction of HB and intended to implement and deliver the scheme in accordance with this 
guidance. Most pilot areas intended to use existing multi-agency structures and did not envisage 
significant resource implications. It was recognised that the scheme was dependent upon a flow 
of data between the courts, the DWP and local sanction pilot coordinators and there was some 
variation in how the sanction would technically be calculated and applied through local authority HB 
management systems.
There were a range of views expressed about the likely effectiveness of the sanction, with a 
consensus that it offered an additional tool and that it was the impact of the threat of sanction on 
individuals’ engagement with support, and the provision of this support, that was the key element. 
It was expected that very small numbers of individuals would be subject to a sanction, given the 
limited numbers of possession cases on the grounds of anti-social behaviour and the propensity of 
individuals to take up intensive support offered to them. There was some uncertainty about how the 
‘appropriate engagement’ of individuals with offered support would be measured and assessed. 
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5 The operation and delivery 
 of the sanction of Housing 
 Benefit
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the developments in the delivery and operation of the sanction of HB schemes 
in the eight local authority pilot areas from May 2008 to 31 October 2009, when the pilot period 
ended. The chapter explains how the scheme was publicised and how it related to partnership 
working and policy and practice developments. The use of the sanction, including the identification 
of eligible cases, is explored and key issues identified. The information presented in this chapter 
is based on three waves of fieldwork comprising documentary analysis and interviews with and 
written responses received from local stakeholders. The research was conducted in August 2008  
to October 2008; January 2009 to April 2009 and September 2009 to November 2009.
5.2 Publicising the sanction of Housing Benefit
The sanction schemes were further publicised in most but not all local authority areas throughout 
the pilot period. This included information in bespoke leaflets, articles in tenants’ newsletters, local 
newspapers and television and on websites and screens in public reception areas of council and 
housing offices. Meetings about the schemes were held with local registered social landlords and 
some private landlords and in some cases, the scheme was covered in joint training activities
Reports and presentations about the schemes were also made to Community Safety Partnership 
boards and Anti-social Behaviour Management groups and the scheme was a standing item on 
some partnership meetings agendas. One pilot area included a session on the sanction scheme at a 
major conference for housing and anti-social behaviour management partners. They had requested 
that a DWP representative address the conference but this did not happen. 
Reference to the sanction of HB sanction was included by some local pilot area local authorities and 
registered social landlords in verbal and written warnings to tenants. In some cases, reference to the 
potential of a sanction of HB was made from the outset of a case and therefore prior to any formal 
warning or enforcement proceedings. In other cases, reference to the potential of a sanction was 
made at the final written warning stage. 
Anti-social behaviour and housing officers in the pilot local authorities and their registered social 
landlord partners has been made aware of the pilot and this had been incorporated into policies and 
case management procedures. 
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5.3 Partnership working and policy and procedural developments
In a number of the pilot local authority areas, there were major restructuring and reconfigurations 
of anti-social behaviour management services, youth offending and support services, housing 
management strategies and regeneration strategies during the period of the pilot. However, these 
were not identified as having a major impact on the rationale or delivery of the sanction schemes, 
which continued to involve the same core group of agencies and officers. 
Similarly, the sanction schemes were not envisaged as necessitating new structures or 
management processes for individual cases but rather offered an additional mechanism within 
existing techniques. There was no need identified for new, bespoke or revised services to be 
introduced as a direct result of the sanction schemes. However, stakeholders did note that this was 
because existing mechanisms and service support provision had not been directly tested by the 
actual application of a sanction of HB.
The pilot area local authorities had strong linkages with some registered social landlords, including 
stock transfer organisations, and official registered social landlord partners, included those who 
had signed up to the Respect Housing Management Standard. However, it was recognised that 
partnership working and data sharing arrangements were not robust enough with all registered 
social landlords and particularly private landlords, to guarantee that sanction coordination panels 
were aware of every potentially eligible case in the local authority area. 
Although it was generally agreed that private landlords were unlikely to evict on the grounds of 
anti-social behaviour, some pilot areas had sought to encourage them to do so and, through further 
anti-social behaviour partnership working and case reviews, it was anticipated that some private 
landlords may be more willing to use anti-social behaviour grounds for possession, which would 
necessitate sanction coordination panels being aware of these cases. 
A common theme across all of the local authority areas during the period of the sanction pilot was 
an increasing emphasis on early intervention, multi-agency working and holistic ‘whole household’ 
approaches. This included the use of:
•	 Acceptable	Behaviour	Contracts.
•	 Parenting	Contracts.
•	 Good	Neighbour	Agreements	and	Community	Agreements.	
•	 New	intensive	intervention	projects.
•	 Intensive	housing	management	support.	
•	 Restorative	justice.	
•	 Parenting	classes,	youth	diversionary	schemes,	and	
•	 Alcohol	and	drugs	initiatives.	
These policy and practice developments meant that further forms of intensive early intervention 
support were being provided to the most vulnerable and problematic households, reducing the 
need for possession orders in a context where such enforcement action was increasingly viewed as 
inappropriate or ineffective. 
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5.4 Use of the sanction of Housing Benefit
During the sanction period (1 November 2007 to 31 October 2009), no individual was subject 
to a sanction of HB. No households were identified as meeting both of the two main eligibility 
requirements: being subject to a Possession Order and evicted on grounds including anti-social 
behaviour and making a subsequent claim for HB for a new address within a pilot area. The reasons 
for this relate partly to the changing focus and reported increasing effectiveness of local anti-social 
behaviour policies described above and also due to problems in identifying eligible cases, discussed 
in the following section. 
During the sanction pilot period a number of individuals and households were warned about the 
potential of a sanction of HB. The contexts, processes and impacts of these warnings are discussed 
in the following chapter of this report. 
5.5 Identifying eligible cases
In most of the pilot local authority areas a small number of households and individuals were 
identified who potentially met the criteria for a future sanction of HB if they were to make a 
subsequent new claim for HB for a property with an address within a pilot area. 
Local authorities or registered social landlords had instigated Possession Order proceedings on the 
grounds of anti-social behaviour in each of the pilot areas during the sanction period. However, the 
complexity of potentially applying a sanction was evident, given that cases could involve dates prior 
to the commencement of the pilot period, starter, introductory or demoted tenancies, the use of 
Injunctions as alternatives, tenants abandoning properties before a warrant was applied for or the 
incorrect wording of court orders. It was also noted that not all social registered landlords or private 
landlords would necessarily provide data about eligible cases to the sanction coordination panels. 
There was no direct communication about potentially eligible cases from the courts to or from the 
DWP and the local pilot sanction coordinators. Some local sanction coordinators were aware of local 
court cases that they had not subsequently been informed of by the DWP.
Although local multi-agency case review and intervention panels were often aware of potential 
cases, they were dependent upon registered social landlords providing information about some 
cases and this was not always provided.
There was uncertainty, given the lack of direct information flow between the courts, the DWP 
and local pilot coordinators, whether local coordination panels could progress the investigation 
of a potential sanction without official direct notification from the Department. There was also 
uncertainty about whether anti-social behaviour occurring at a new address was a prerequisite for 
the consideration of a potential sanction. Data protection requirements, such as encryption were 
identified as creating challenges and there was a lack of clarity about whether information would be 
provided to anti-social behaviour coordinators or HB managers within the pilot local authorities.
In some cases individuals or households who were potentially eligible for a sanction, on the grounds 
of eviction for anti-social behaviour, had been referred to FIPs and several stakeholders suggested 
that such individuals or households either did not meet the criteria for a sanction or voluntarily took 
up support in any case. 
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5.6 Issues
There were a number of problems which prevented the envisaged reporting and notification 
processes between the courts, the DWP and the sanction coordinators within the local authority 
pilot areas from functioning effectively. This resulted in the sanction coordinators not receiving 
notification of potential cases from the DWP, as the guidance originally envisaged. 
The problems included: 
•	 local	courts	not	identifying	or	informing	the	DWP	of	cases;	
•	 the	envisaged	central	computer	database	not	being	fully	established;	
•	 data	protection	concerns;	continuing	uncertainty	about	the	grounds	for	eligibility;	
•	 the	limited	use	of	anti-social	behaviour	grounds	in	possession	orders;	and	
•	 the	ineligibility	of	cases	involving	probationary,	introductory	or	demoted	tenancies.	
5.7 Summary
The sanction of HB schemes were publicised through a range of mechanisms in most  
of the pilot areas. Although there were major restructuring of services in several local authority 
areas during the period of the pilot, this did not affect the sanction of HB scheme. In all of the pilot 
areas during the period of the pilot, increasing emphasis was given to early intervention, prevention 
and intensive support which meant that post-eviction enforcement action such as a sanction of 
HB (albeit as a mechanism for facilitating the take up of support) was increasingly out of step with 
policy developments and objectives.
No individual was subject to a sanction of HB during the pilot period (1 November 2007 to 31 
October 2009) although a number of individuals were warned directly about the possibility of  
a potential future sanction. 
In addition to the counter-trends in policy developments described above, there was a difficulty in 
identifying eligible cases due to the lack of information flow between the courts, the DWP and local 
sanction pilot scheme coordinators. In some instances, local sanction coordination panels were 
aware of cases that may have met the initial eligibility criteria (eviction on the grounds of  
anti-social behaviour) but they were not informed of these cases by the DWP and in no such case 
was a subsequent new claim for HB from an address within a pilot local authority area identified. 
In addition to the problems with the exchange of information, the limited use of anti-social 
behaviour grounds for possession, the ineligibility of cases involving probationary, introductory 
or demoted tenancies, the abandonment of properties by tenants prior to warrants being issued 
and limited information about the actions of some social registered and private landlords further 
reduced the number of cases potentially meeting the criteria for consideration of a future sanction 
of HB.
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6 The use and impacts of 
 warnings of a potential 
 sanction of Housing Benefit
6.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an account on how warnings about the possibility of a future potential 
sanction of HB were used within the pilot local authorities’ anti-social behaviour case management 
procedures and processes. The chapter also presents some exploratory findings on  
the perceived impacts of these warnings on individuals who received them. The very limited 
research methodology should be noted in considering the implications of these findings. 
6.2 Warning procedures and processes
In at least one pilot area a decision had been taken that it was unlikely that the sanction would be 
utilised. The view was taken that there would therefore be no point in warning households about a 
potential sanction at an early stage as this potential penalty was too far in the future: 
‘In effect we’d be saying if we get possession and if you get evicted and if you then make a 
Housing Benefit application and if you don’t comply with support then we may apply a sanction.’ 
It was also argued that, as the practice and policy was only to pursue for eviction if all else had 
failed, eviction would not be used as a threat so it was difficult to envisage what a household could 
do to convince the agencies to withdraw legal action at this point.
The variation between pilot areas was evident in the differential extent to which warnings about the 
sanction had been issued. In some pilot areas housing and anti-social behaviour officers reported 
that no individuals had been specifically warned about a sanction, whilst in other areas several 
individuals had been directly warned, although it was not possible to quantify the exact numbers 
of individuals as central anti-social behaviour teams would not be aware of the daily practices of 
front line officers. In all of the pilot areas it was apparent that warnings about the sanction were not 
being widely or routinely used by landlords other than the local authority or large stock transfer or 
ALMO organisations.
Where the sanction had been mentioned, some individuals had requested further explanation of 
the scheme if a warning letter about the sanction had been read in the presence of an anti-social 
behaviour or housing officer, but there were no reported examples of individuals finding out about 
the sanction independently and then asking for clarification or more information. Similarly, articles 
about the sanction in tenant newsletters had not generated any responses or enquiries. 
The stage in the anti-social behaviour case management process when a warning about a potential 
future sanction of HB would be issued varied between pilot areas. In some pilot areas, information 
about the sanction was widely disseminated through leaflets, articles in tenant newsletters and 
displays on screens in housing offices. In other areas, it was reported that the sanction was not 
generally publicised, that most tenants would therefore not be aware of the scheme and that 
the scheme was not mentioned to new tenants as they were on introductory tenancies (where 
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the sanction would not apply) and the sanction was not mentioned at sign up stage as this was 
regarded as ‘too much additional information to take in, which may not be relevant.’ 
In some pilot areas it was reported that warnings about the potential of a future sanction of HB 
were issued at an early stage when tenants were first spoken to about their behaviour and that 
information about the sanction were contained in all procedural letters and the sanction was 
referred to during initial visits to households. In one pilot area households were warned verbally and 
in writing although there was no standard procedure, rather warnings were issued at the informed 
discretion of the housing or anti-social behaviour officer. However, these warnings would not be 
issued in cases where other methods, such as mediation, would be more appropriate. 
In other pilot areas it was reported that a warning about the sanction would not be issued until 
the final warning letter stage. This was regarded as the most appropriate mechanism for using 
the warning of a sanction of HB to reinforce the seriousness of a situation. In another pilot area, 
warnings about the potential of a housing sanction would not be made until possession action had 
actually commenced.
In one pilot area, when a case was taken to court a press release was issued with details of the case, 
a letter warning about the potential of a future sanction of HB was sent to the tenant and the FIPs 
was informed. The process was subsequently amended so that reference to the potential sanction 
was included in all warning letters, so that households would already have been warned about the 
sanction by the time they were in contact with the anti-social behaviour enforcement team.
Although in some pilot areas individuals had been warned verbally and in writing it is important to 
note that the sanction of HB sanction was not the only consequence that the individual was made 
aware of and other measures including eviction, ASBOs and Acceptable Behaviour Contracts were 
also be referred to simultaneously.
6.3 Reactions to, and impacts of, warnings
Housing and anti-social behaviour officers reported that the reactions of individuals to the threat 
of further action, including the future sanction of HB, varied considerably. Some individuals were 
reported to be very apologetic and to change their behaviour, others denied wrong doing and 
were indignant and in some cases individuals simply did not believe that action would be taken. 
Therefore, the reaction of an individual to a warning about a sanction of HB and the subsequent 
impact on their future behaviour was likely to be similar to their reaction to threats of further action 
more generally. A common viewpoint was that individuals did not necessarily understand the 
potential threat of a sanction, particularly as it was an action that would affect them some time into 
the future:
‘I don’t know how much they take on board, probably the same as the impact of the warning 
letter more generally. The fact that they end up going to court probably reflects the fact that it 
doesn’t have a lot of impact.’
‘Individuals liable to receive a warning about a potential Housing Benefit sanction live from day 
to day in the majority of cases and to mention something that is so far away means nothing. 
They don’t grasp it.’
‘Tenants who cause anti-social behaviour are often of a certain mind set whereby they assume 
threats won’t materialise, it’s not going to happen and it doesn’t matter what you say to them.’
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Therefore, the threat of a sanction ‘down the line’ was viewed as likely to be ineffective in most 
cases. It was argued by some stakeholders that some individuals often believe they will be able 
to find alternative accommodation in the private rented sector and so are not ‘unduly concerned’ 
about the threat of eviction. 
All of the officers in the pilot areas suggested that it was impossible to quantify the independent 
impact of the warning of a sanction of HB as this was usually issued simultaneously to the threat 
of possession or other legal action. It was unfeasible to discern the disaggregated impact of a 
warning about a potential sanction of HB as there were a range of factors that influenced whether 
an individual or household would continue or desist from further anti-social behaviour. In many 
cases, the final warning stage resulted in an improvement in behaviour. It was therefore reported to 
be difficult to judge whether it was the threat of eviction or the threat of a sanction of HB that led to 
a change in behaviour (in cases where a change occurred) but officers generally believed that it was 
more likely to be the more immediate threat of eviction and homelessness. 
Although some individuals were reported to ‘not worry’ about the threat of a sanction or eviction, in 
some cases, officers argued that, as identified by the individuals subject to action discussed below, 
‘the prospect of losing the home is a frightening one…it’s the ultimate sanction’. 
‘Whether it is the threat of a sanction that has had the impact or the threat of losing the home 
– I suspect it is the threat of losing the home rather than the sanction. As I said, most nuisance 
tends to die down after the final warning.’ 
The general consensus amongst officers was therefore that the ‘critical point’ for households was 
when they were going to lose their tenancy and if the threat of losing their home had no impact 
then a sanction of HB in the future was unlikely to be a significant factor. One housing officer who 
had issued a verbal warning about the sanction of HB to a household confirmed that this ‘had not 
had any impact’. 
In one pilot area extensive use was made of publicising legal cases, through press releases 
and leaflets (including, in some cases, photographs of the perpetrator) distributed in local 
neighbourhoods. Officers in this pilot area argued that it was the threat of adverse publicity that was 
the most significant deterrent, even more so than eviction and certainly more so than the threat of a 
future sanction of HB:
‘They [individuals subject to legal action] worry more about that [the press release] than they 
do about losing their house…people do not want their picture in the paper and that has a huge 
impact.’ 
It was also argued that Closure Orders and the publicity that these generated had an ‘amazing 
impact’ on local communities.
It was difficult for officers to assess if the specific threat of a future sanction of HB had encouraged 
individuals to take up or engage with support. It was reported that, in general, individuals with drug 
and alcohol problems tended to take up support, but it was more difficult to ensure that individuals 
with mental health conditions engaged with support and then sustained this engagement (such 
cases would not, in any event, meet the eligibility criteria for a sanction of HB). One FIPs manager 
stated that although the threat of sanction had yet to have an impact (as cases were only now 
being accepted by the Project), the sanction could provide a lever to encourage households to 
change their behaviour as these households may not be willing to engage with support without the 
motivation that enforcement action may provide:
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‘There’s got to be something because if not they’ll just ignore us…its not just about giving them 
support, its about giving them the motivation to change…these families don’t take any notice 
of what’s being said. Now if we’ve got enforcement to say this is non-negotiable support, if you 
take this on the sanctions won’t be carried through, therefore it’s a bargaining tool if you like, but 
there’s got to be sanctions there…as long as there’s some sort of enforcement tool there then 
we can negotiate with them...there needs to be the threat there.’ 
FIP workers in another pilot area similarly believed that the threat of the sanction could provide 
‘some leverage’ in persuading individuals to engage meaningfully with the support offered to them. 
However, it was also emphasised that most individuals engaged with this support in any case. 
Officers also believed that the impact of the sanction would only become apparent once individuals 
had actually been sanctioned and that the publicity attached to this may have a significant impact 
on other residents: 
‘Until somebody has had the sanction applied and the jungle drums start beating and the 
sanction receives more publicity then it is unlikely to have any effect. People don’t understand 
quite what it is, until it happens and people realise what it’s about.’
6.4 The views of individuals subject to anti-social behaviour   
 interventions
Interviews were conducted with four individuals subject to anti-social behaviour interventions in 
one pilot area. The anti-social behaviour included noise, harassment and in one case drugs (which 
resulted in an eviction). Three of the individuals were in receipt of HB. The individuals reported 
disputes with neighbours and often believed that they themselves were the victims of anti-social 
behaviour or were subject to unreasonable conduct by their neighbours. The individuals’ perceptions 
of housing officers varied from viewing them as very helpful and understanding to a belief that they 
were ‘high handed’ and offered no support. 
However, some individuals acknowledged that support may have been offered but they had not 
pursued this (for example never being at home when a housing officer attempted to visit them). It 
was apparent that a range of intervention mechanisms had been utilised in these cases, including 
visits, interviews, incident diaries and mediation. In each case individuals had received verbal and 
written warnings, including the threat of eviction. 
None of the four individuals recalled hearing about the potential of a sanction of HB, although they 
could recall warnings about eviction. The final warning letter issued to these individuals clearly 
stated: 
‘From 1 November 2007 if you are evicted on the grounds of anti-social behaviour, your full 
entitlement will be affected unless you comply with certain conditions. Information on this can 
be obtained from your housing office or be visiting: www.benefit-leaflets.org’
However, none of the individuals were aware of the sanction and they did not remember a potential 
sanction being discussed. Individuals’ reactions to the threat of eviction varied from regarding this 
as ‘obviously threatening things to hear, not very comfortable’ and resulting in a change of behaviour 
(albeit one that the individual believed put unfair and undue restrictions upon them in their own 
home) to not being too concerned and being confident about finding alternative accommodation. 
One individual, on being informed by the researcher about the sanction of HB, felt that this would be 
an unfair measure as it may penalise those who were wrongly accused of anti-social behaviour and 
would make it very difficult for those dependent on HB to get re-housed.
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6.5 Summary
There was considerable differentiation between the sanction pilot areas with regard to the extent to 
which warnings about a potential sanction of HB were issued, the form that this warning took and 
the stage in individual cases where it was deemed appropriate.
It was not possible to disaggregate the independent impact of a warning of a potential future 
sanction of HB on the behaviour and engagement with support of individuals and households. 
Individuals’ responses to the threat of a sanction is likely to be similar to their reaction to a final 
warning and the possibility of legal action more generally and it was widely believed that eviction, 
resultant homelessness (and in one pilot area adverse publicity) would have a greater impact.
This is supported by the (albeit very limited) evidence that individuals subject to a warning about 
a sanction of HB could not recall this and the views of officers that warnings about a sanction did 
not have a significant impact in their own right. Some research participants believed that a warning 
about a potential sanction of HB may provide additional leverage in persuading individuals to take 
up offers of support, although the majority of individuals already take up this support in any case. 
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7 Key findings and conclusions
7.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the key findings and conclusions of the evaluation of the pilot of the 
sanction of HB in eight local authority areas in England. The chapter draws on material gathered 
throughout the evaluation research and data drawn from a final round of reflective interviews 
with, and written responses from, local stakeholders in the eight pilot areas. This final phase of the 
research was conducted between September 2009 and November 2009.
7.2 The use of the sanction of Housing Benefit during the pilot  
 period
The sanction of HB was not applied against any individual during the period of the sanction 
stipulated in legislation: 1 November 2007 to 31 October 2009. Six of the pilot local authorities also 
reported that there were no cases where a sanction was actually considered by a sanction panel. 
The sanction panel was close to being convened in one case in the Wirral. One household who were 
evicted on the grounds of anti-social behaviour in July 2009 had secured a new property in the 
private rented sector and had applied for HB. The household (who had previously turned down an 
offer of support from the Wirral FIP) were sent a letter informing them that the sanction panel was 
due to convene to consider applying a sanction. 
At this point the family began to engage with the FIP and so the sanction panel was not convened. 
At the time of writing, the family was still engaging with the FIP and there had been no further 
complaints about anti-social behaviour involving the family. Five of the pilot local authorities 
reported that they were not aware of any cases in their area during the period of the sanction pilot 
where an individual would have potentially have been eligible for a sanction (i.e. having been evicted 
on the grounds of anti-social behaviour and having made a subsequent claim for HB at an address 
within a pilot area). 
In Blackpool there was one case involving an individual who was evicted, partly due to anti-social 
behaviour, and subsequently made a new claim for HB. However, the individual was technically 
ineligible for the sanction due to the wording of an amended court order. By the time the new 
HB claim was made the individual was living in a hostel and had accepted support to address the 
behaviour. The individual left the hostel and there had been no more complaints of anti-social 
behaviour. 
However, it was not possible to establish whether this was due to the support that the individual 
received, the ASBO that they were subject to or the fact that they moved to a new locality. In the 
Wirral there were four eligible cases. In addition to the case described above, one case involved an 
individual who engaged with the FIP after eviction but prior to consideration of a sanction of HB. 
Another case involved an evicted individual who had made a subsequent HB claim and a further 
case was being assessed, but in both of these cases the pilot period ended before a sanction could 
be considered or applied, which the local authority stakeholders reported to be ‘very frustrating.’ 
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7.3 Eviction actions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour   
 during the pilot period
The number of evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour in each local authority area during 
the period of the pilot (1 November 2007 to 31 October 2009) is shown in Table 7.1. Information 
from Manchester was not available. A total of 41 cases were identified. Over a third of these cases 
(37 per cent) were in the Wirral. These cases provided the sample from which potential sanctions 
may have subsequently been considered (i.e. they would meet the first criteria of an eviction on 
the grounds of anti-social behaviour). The actual number of evictions on the grounds of anti-social 
behaviour in some local authority areas during the pilot period could have been higher as details 
of cases were not universally provided by all registered social landlords to anti-social behaviour 
coordinators or community safety managers. 
Table 7.1 Eviction actions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour
Local authority Number of evictions on the grounds of  
anti-social behaviour
Blackpool 9
Blackburn with Darwen 4
Dover 5
Manchester Data not provided
Newham 1
New Forest 4
South Gloucestershire 1
Wirral 17
Total 41
Source: Data provided by pilot coordinators, 2009. 
It is important to note that these figures were provided by pilot coordinators and are not based on 
actual court orders. They could, therefore include cases involving demoted or probationary tenancies 
or cases involving anti-social behaviour and rent arrears. In such cases, eviction proceedings on the 
grounds of anti-social behaviour may not have actually occurred. 
One of the issues identified in early phases of the research was the propensity of landlords to pursue 
eviction on the grounds of rent arrears even in cases where anti-social behaviour was involved. In 
Blackpool, there was one case where the court evicted a tenant on the grounds of rent arrears when 
there was an element of anti-social behaviour. However, this did not happen again and the local 
authority stated that anti-social behaviour would take prominence over rent arrears as grounds for 
eviction. 
There was also one such case in Newham and two cases in South Gloucestershire and it was 
reported that there were also likely to have been cases in Wirral. Anti-social behaviour coordinators 
in Blackburn with Darwen and Newham were not aware of any such cases. In Dover there were no 
cases as the council’s anti-social behaviour team had worked with their housing colleagues and 
registered social landlords to ensure that eviction would not be pursued on the grounds of rent 
arrears in cases involving anti-social behaviour. 
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7.4 The use and impact of warning individuals about a  
 potential sanction
No individuals in Newham were warned about a possible sanction of HB. Individuals were warned 
about the potential of a future sanction in Blackpool. Some individuals were reported to have 
changed their behaviour and other individuals had not done so, but it was difficult to assess the 
specific impact of the warning as the individuals would also have been warned about possession 
and eviction. Similarly, in Dover, individuals had been warned and had modified their behaviour and/
or taken up low level floating support but it was not possible to establish whether this was due to 
the warning of a future sanction of HB rather than the threat of eviction or an ASBO. In Blackburn, 
a number of Twin Valley Homes tenants were warned about a potential sanction but this was not 
perceived to have changed their behaviour. 
Similarly, in the New Forest it was perceived that, although individuals who had been warned had 
‘taken the warning on board’ and acknowledged the negative consequences, any impact of the 
warning was diminished because the potential sanction was so far in the future and involved many 
different stages and steps; it was not possible to identify any cases with certainty where a warning 
about a sanction had impacted on behaviour. However, anti-social behaviour officers in Wirral 
believed that the warning of a potential sanction of HB had been ‘instrumental’ in triggering the 
engagement of four households subject to possession and eviction actions with the FIPs (from a 
total of nine possession cases where warnings about the sanction were issued). 
7.5 Reflections on the pilot 
A number of practitioners believed that there were flaws in the sanction scheme from the outset 
which meant that the sanction of HB was unlikely to have worked as it was envisaged. These 
included:
•	 The	lack	of	joint	working	with,	and	communication	from,	the	courts.
•	 The	sanction	scheme	being	out	of	step	with	the	wider	policy	focus	on	early	intervention	and	
preventing eviction.
•	 The	use	of	introductory	and	demoted	tenancies	and	the	subsequent	lack	of	an	eviction,	limiting	
the number of potentially eligible cases.
•	 It	remained	easier	to	evict	on	the	grounds	of	rent	arrears,	and
•	 Families	tended	to	‘disappear’	and	lose	contact	with	agencies	after	an	eviction.
Other practitioners argued that the sanction scheme was never going to work because the threat 
of a future sanction of HB was not enough of a deterrent, the individuals involved in anti-social 
behaviour did not think that far ahead and the impact would be landlords losing rental payments 
rather than individuals experiencing a direct reduction in their income. It was also suggested that 
the process to sanction was too lengthy and complicated as it was a post-eviction measure that 
could only be applied after individuals had made a subsequent HB claim.
Practitioners reported that there was no communication between the courts and the DWP and that 
there had been little or no contact between the DWP and the pilot areas since the initial stages of 
the sanction scheme. Pilot areas were not informed about whether the systems required to inform 
sanction scheme coordinators about court cases were ever put in place and some practitioners 
believed that the pilot would have needed to be based on the local identification of cases rather 
than depending upon a national database. 
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Some practitioners argued that the pilot areas had not received enough support from the DWP. 
For example, practitioners argued the DWP had not supported the local schemes with a national 
publicity campaign and had not taken up an invitation from one local area to promote the pilot at 
an anti-social behaviour conference for landlords. One local pilot coordinator was also disappointed 
that there had been no involvement or contact from the Home Office and the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families (now the Department for Education). Some practitioners stated that 
they would have welcomed sharing learning and good practice with other pilot areas. 
Two pilot coordinators stated that the effectiveness of the sanction scheme was dependent upon 
the engagement with, and proactive implementation of, the measure by individual landlords. There 
were some continuing ambiguities about the grounds for a sanction, for example whether there had 
to be evidence of anti-social behaviour from the new property that a subsequent post-eviction HB 
claim was made from for a sanction to be considered. 
Some practitioners were more supportive of the concept and principles of the sanction of HB but 
believed that its implementation in practice had been disappointing. Practitioners from one pilot 
area were ‘sure’ that the threat of a sanction had triggered some families’ engagement with support 
services and this proved that the pilot had achieved some impact and that, based on warnings 
rather than the actual application of a sanction, the scheme was time and cost effective given this 
impact. 
Practitioners in another pilot area reported that although the sanction of HB itself has not been 
applied, the pilot had triggered debates and reflections about the characteristics of the main 
perpetrators of anti-social behaviour and how to target resources on the main problems. As a result 
the local authority were now focusing attention on alcohol misuse and the night time economy and 
health-related policies related to the causes of anti-social behaviour. The sanction of HB was viewed 
as being less relevant to this emerging agenda. 
7.6 Suggested revisions to the sanction of Housing Benefit 
 scheme
Some practitioners believed that the sanction of HB would be more effective as a pre-eviction 
measure because it was more likely to have an impact on behaviour, it could potentially be a more 
streamlined and effective process than securing an ASBO and that some loss of rental income, if 
it resulted in a change of behaviour, would be less costly than an eviction. One practitioner also 
argued that a pre-eviction sanction measure would link more directly and robustly with existing 
processes and approaches to addressing anti-social behaviour and ensuring the engagement of 
individuals with support packages. 
However other practitioners argued that it would be difficult to apply a sanction pre-eviction as the 
individual subject to sanction would then potentially have legal redress if they fell into arrears and 
many landlords would not support a pre-eviction scheme. It was also suggested that it would be 
politically difficult in some local areas to support a measure sanctioning HB in cases that had not 
been deemed serious enough to have warranted actual eviction. 
One pilot coordinator suggested that some responsibilities for administering the sanction should 
be devolved to frontline enforcement officers and that there needed to be a clear hierarchy of final 
decision-making power within sanction panels to avoid ‘stalemate situations’ about applying a 
sanction. Another practitioner recommended that the scheme should be supported by a system 
through which the courts providing automatic notification to local anti-social behaviour coordinators 
about all cases involving evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour. 
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7.7 Views on continuing and/or rolling out the pilot 
The majority of anti-social behaviour practitioners did not think that there would be much purpose 
continuing with the sanction of HB scheme in its current pilot form. One practitioner did not believe 
that the sanction scheme should continue as it could not be applied to owner occupiers and would 
therefore not fit with equalities agendas. This practitioner also believed that amended forms of Fixed 
Penalty Notices would be a more effective and cross-tenure mechanism for applying a fiscal penalty 
for anti-social behaviour (although this was not explicitly linked to the primary purpose of a sanction 
being to facilitate individuals engaging with support).
However, one pilot coordinator believed that the sanction could have a ‘significant’ impact on 
tenants and could be utilised to provide a clear warning. This coordinator argued that there was 
a potential role for the sanction, even within an anti-social behaviour strategy premised on early 
intervention, as it would link support to clear warnings. This would enable an additional package 
of support to be put in place for a new tenancy with explicit consequences if individuals did not 
engage with this support. In another pilot area the existing sanction model was regarded as being 
very useful as ‘another tool in the armoury’ for addressing anti-social behaviour and it was argued 
that the threat of a sanction has proved to be particularly effective at the ‘end stage’ of cases to 
compel individuals to engage with support packages. Other practitioners believed that a pre-eviction 
sanction would potentially be effective and that this would provide anti-social behaviour officers 
with another tool to address serious anti-social behaviour. 
Most practitioners stated that it was impossible for them to recommend the rolling out of the 
sanction nationally given that there was no evidence of the outcomes and that the systems and 
processes established in the pilot areas were never used or tested. One pilot coordinator believed 
‘absolutely’ that the sanction should be rolled out nationally as it was an effective deterrent that 
added more weight to the enforcement process and had been demonstrated (through warnings 
rather than the application of the sanction) to have had an impact on behaviour and engagement 
with support packages. 
One pilot coordinator made the point that anti-social behaviour practitioners had been ‘swamped’ 
with new legislation and measures and needed to focus upon maximising the effectiveness of 
existing mechanisms rather than considering new schemes. It was also suggested that rolling out 
the scheme nationally in its current form would be at odds with the policy emphasis upon early 
intervention and prevention. 
One pilot coordinator believed that, if the pilot were to be extended or rolled out, a great deal of 
work would be required with landlords as the effectiveness of the sanction scheme was dependent 
on housing providers and there were many different housing providers in each local area. Anti-social 
behaviour teams could establish processes and procedures and publicise the sanction schemes, 
but if housing providers did not engage and implement the scheme then its effectiveness would 
be limited and sanction coordinators and panels would not necessarily be informed about each 
potentially eligible case. Another pilot coordinator was concerned about whether appropriate 
support services would always be in place for single persons subject to a sanction of HB (compared 
to the provision of FIPs) and when these services needed to be developed. 
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7.8 Conclusions
An actual sanction of a reduction of HB was not applied to any individual in any of the eight pilot 
local authority areas during the pilot period (1 November 2007 to 31 October 2009). 
In all but one pilot area, no cases were considered for a sanction by a sanction panel. In five of the 
pilot areas, no potentially eligible cases were identified during the period of the sanction pilot (i.e. 
no individuals were identified who had been evicted on the grounds of anti-social behaviour and 
subsequently made a new claim for HB from an address within the pilot area). A small number of 
potentially eligible cases were identified in Blackpool and Wirral. The case in Blackpool was deemed 
to be ineligible for a potential sanction due to wording of an amended court order. In Wirral, there 
were four eligible cases identified. Two of the cases occurred too late in the pilot period to be 
considered for a sanction and in a third case the household engaged with the FIP prior to a sanction 
being considered. In the fourth case, the sanction panel was due to be convened but the family 
involved began to engage with the Wirral Family Intervention prior to the meeting of the panel and 
the panel was not therefore subsequently convened. 
A total of 41 evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour were identified during the period of 
the sanction pilot (based on information provided by seven of the pilot areas). Seventeen of these 
cases were in Wirral. It was reported that in some local areas there may have been other cases 
pursued by landlords that sanction coordinators were not made aware of. There were also some 
cases involving anti-social behaviour where evictions were pursued on the grounds of rent arrears.
There were three views expressed about the impacts of individuals being warned about a potential 
future sanction of HB. Some practitioners believed that the warning had no impact as it related to 
action that was too far in the future and involved too many additional steps. Other practitioners 
stated that the warning may have had some impact but that it was not possible to identify the 
precise impact of the warning and to disaggregate this from the influence of other factors such 
as the threat of eviction or the use of an ASBO. Practitioners in one pilot area strongly believed 
that warnings about a potential future sanction of HB had been instrumental in some households 
engaging with support packages. 
The majority of practitioners expressed disappointment in the operation of the sanction pilot and 
believed that it had not had any real impact. They cited a number of key flaws including the lack 
of communication from the courts and the DWP, the difficulty in tracking households after eviction 
and the limitations of a post-eviction mechanism (including the growing use of introductory, 
probationary and demoted tenancies that do not require a possession order to terminate the 
tenancy). 
The local practitioners were divided about whether a pre-eviction HB sanction would be more 
effective and appropriate. Most practitioners did not believe that the sanction scheme should be 
continued in their area, although continuation of the scheme was strongly supported in one local 
authority area.
The majority of local practitioners stated that it was not possible to recommend that the sanction  
be rolled out nationally as there had not been any assessment of the actual processes and 
outcomes of applying a sanction. Although practitioners in one local authority area strongly 
supported the sanction being rolled out nationally on the basis that warnings about a sanction had 
led to some individuals engaging with support packages, other practitioners were concerned that 
the sanction went against the current policy emphasis on prevention, early intervention and eviction 
being a last resort and the sanction may not meet the requirements of equalities legislation.
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In conclusion, the fact that no individual was subject to a sanction of HB during the period of the 
pilot reflects a range of factors including technical problems in the exchange of information, legal 
and procedural limitations to the eligibility of cases and the post-eviction enforcement focus of 
the sanction being out of step with the growing emphasis on early intervention and sustaining 
households within existing tenancies. Although practitioners’ views on the impacts of warnings 
about the sanctions varied, it is evident that the sanction was conceptualised on the basis of 
logical, legal, financial and future-orientated decision-making within households subject to serious 
enforcement measures. 
However, this does not reflect the realities of the households’ circumstances or the primary drivers 
of behavioural change (Lister, 2004; McIntosh, 2008; Holt, 2008; Flint and Hunter, 2011). Although 
some practitioners believed that the threat of a sanction of HB could further facilitate some 
individuals’ engagement with intensive support services, most individuals accept the support offered 
to them (Burney and Gelsthorpe, 2008; McIntyre-Bhatty, 2008) and its is the ability of support 
workers to build a relationship of trust with individuals, rather than legal or financial incentives, that 
is crucial in sustaining engagement with packages of support and achieving behavioural change 
(Nixon et al., 2006; Pawson et al., 2009). 
The contemporary housing market context has changed significantly since the pilot schemes were 
established and further reforms to HB are being introduced by the new Government. However, there 
remains a need to understand the complex impacts of balancing support and enforcement and the 
specific role that coercion and sanction may play in facilitating the take up of support (Fitzpatrick 
and Jones, 2005; Johnsen and Fitzpatrick, 2008; Deacon, 2004; Morgan, 2010; Flint and Hunter, 
2011). As Crawford and Lister (2007) argue, one of the key outcomes of the risk of enforcement 
measures has been the encouragement to local agencies and authorities to identify complex 
household needs and to provide and resource appropriate packages of intensive support combined 
with more effective mechanisms for engaging individuals and households with this support. This is 
where contemporary policy development should be focused. 
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Appendix A 
Further information about the 
pilot localities
A.1 Introduction
This appendix provides further information about the local demographic and housing contexts 
of the eight local authority areas where the sanction of HB was piloted. Summary information 
is also provided about the type and extent of anti-social behaviour in each area and the agency 
and partnership structures in place to address anti-social behaviour. The data is drawn from key 
planning, housing and community safety strategy documents and interviews with stakeholders and 
refers to the period when the sanction of HB pilot schemes were being established in September and 
October 2007. 
A.2 Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council
A.2.1 Population and housing
Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council covers a predominantly urban area in the north west of 
England. According to the 2001 Census, the population was just under 138,000 with Blackburn itself 
accounting for 74 per cent of the population. The proportion of the population who were under 16 
years of age was the tenth highest of all local authorities in England. Twenty-two per cent of the 
population was from Black and Minority Ethnic groups, the largest proportions being from Indian 
(10.7 per cent) and Pakistani (8.7 per cent) backgrounds. 
The English Indices of Deprivation 2004 identified Blackburn with Darwen as one of the most 
deprived boroughs regionally and nationally. The borough had comparatively low rates of economic 
activity and almost a third (32.3 per cent) of children lived in families claiming a key benefit – far 
higher than the average for the North West region (26 per cent) and for England as a whole  
(22 per cent). The Borough also had a higher than average crime rate, reflected in the fact that the 
insurance rate for Blackburn was 37 per cent higher than the average for England.
Blackburn with Darwen had 58,477 dwellings. Of these, 68 per cent were owner occupied, 21 per 
cent were housing association rented and 11 per cent private rented. A high proportion of homes 
were unfit or obsolete and there were problems of low demand in some areas. Although house 
prices were relatively modest in the area, they were still beyond the reach of many low income 
households. Reliance on the private sector had increased and the growth of buy to let had resulted 
in a large number of private landlords in the borough. Blackburn with Darwen suffered from chronic 
and widespread poor housing conditions in the private sector. 
In March 2001, Blackburn and Darwen Council transferred its stock to Twin Valley Homes, which has 
8,582 properties out of the total 12,013 housing association properties. The majority of lettings are 
made through Blackburn and Darwen’s choice based letting system (‘B with Us’). Around 20 per cent 
of lettings in 2003-04 were to priority homeless households, 19 per cent to households who had 
previously been living in the private rented sector and 32 per cent who had been living with family or 
friends. Just 18 per cent of these new tenants were in paid employment and only 13 per cent were 
not in receipt of any form of benefit. 
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A.2.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
Blackburn with Darwen’s Community Safety Partnership consultation with residents and 
organisations illustrated that local concerns around anti-social behaviour mainly centred on 
nuisance behaviour, deliberate fire setting, graffiti and fly tipping. In 2001/02 Twin Valley Homes 
received 1,092 complaints about anti-social behaviour. Of these, 77 per cent related to ‘nuisance.’ 
Local stakeholders reported that the main types of anti-social behaviour they dealt with were youth 
nuisance, drunken behaviour and disturbances caused by visitors to a property. 
A.2.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures
Blackburn with Darwen Community Safety Partnership was developed in 2004 when the Crime 
and Disorder Partnership merged with the Drug and Alcohol Action Team. In the same year the 
Borough achieved Together Action Area status and, in 2007, the borough was one of the first 40 
local authorities to be invited to become a Respect Area. Blackburn and Darwen Community Safety 
Partnership is committed to: ‘adopting a balanced approach to resolving problems of anti-social 
behaviour that considers activities around prevention, intervention, enforcement, rehabilitation and 
resettlement.’ 
The Community Safety Team was based within the local authority’s Regeneration and 
Neighbourhoods Department and included an anti-social behaviour manager, a seconded police 
officer, a case manager and two parenting practitioners. The team worked closely with the 
Borough’s preferred partners (the four largest registered social landlords), who were all signed up to 
the Respect Housing Standard and the Anti-social Behaviour Action Plan. Twin Valleys Homes had a 
staff of five full time anti-social behaviour officers and a manager who dealt with the more serious 
cases of anti-social behaviour. 
The majority of cases of anti-social behaviour were resolved through early intervention work by 
Twin Valley Homes staff and only a small per centage of cases proceeded to court. For example, 
one stakeholder reported that 20 out of 500 cases in the previous year had resulted in court 
proceedings. Very few cases resulted in eviction (only four cases in 2006-07). This was attributed by 
local stakeholders to the success of early intervention and the use of alternative enforcement tools, 
particularly injunctions, and also to the fact that some perpetrators abandoned their properties 
before the Possession stage. 
More difficult cases that required enforcement action against a household with children were 
referred to the Community Safety Team’s Case Intervention Panel which decided on the appropriate 
action including support. The panel was made up of senior agency representatives including: the 
five neighbourhood police sergeants; the heads of the Council’s Children’s, Education Welfare and 
Adult Social Services; the deputy manager of the Youth Offending Team; the manager of the FIP; 
Community Safety Team representatives, Twin Valley Home’s anti-social behaviour manager and 
the senior parenting practitioner. Additional agencies were included on the panel depending on the 
needs of individual cases. 
Overall respondents felt that the borough was well provided with support services, with an active 
and diverse voluntary sector offering support services, although there were concerns that statutory 
services were overstretched and that drug and alcohol services were already oversubscribed. 
The Darwen Family Intervention Programme was established in 2003. The service was set up as a 
partnership involving the Council, Twin Valley Homes, Lancashire Constabulary and NCH to provide 
outreach support to families under threat of eviction for anti-social behaviour. The project had 
received additional funding under the Respect programme and provided managed housing as well 
as floating support to families, including those in owner occupation. The borough also employed 
two Respect-programme funded Parenting Practitioners who specialised in addressing anti-social 
behaviour. 
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A.3 Blackpool Borough Council
A.3.1 Population and housing
Blackpool is a major tourism resort in the North-West of England with a population of 142,283 
which, according to figures from the 2001 Census had declined by 2.6 per cent over the last decade. 
There were 63,940 households. Just over a quarter (25.5 per cent) of the town’s population was 
aged 65 or over, compared to 15.9 per cent for England and Wales as a whole. Of these households 
5,390 (8.4 per cent) were lone parents compared to 6.4 per cent nationally. 1.6 per cent of the 
population were from Black and Minority Ethnic backgrounds, with the largest of these groups being 
Irish, Chinese and Asian.
Blackpool was the sixth most deprived local authority area in the North-West region; 25 localities 
were in the most deprived ten per cent of all the lower-layer Census 2001 Super Output Areas in 
England. In terms of health deprivation and disability, 74 out of 94 Blackpool localities were in the 
most deprived quartile of all English localities and 42.9 per cent of households contained at least 
one person with a limiting long-term illness. Blackpool had the second lowest life expectancy for 
men, the highest alcohol related death rates and the third highest teenage pregnancy rates in 
the region. Annual claimant unemployment rates were relatively low by historical standards but 
as a tourist area the local labour market experiences substantial seasonal fluctuation with winter 
unemployment numbers normally peaking at 50 per cent above the previous summer’s total. 
Worklessness within the working age population is higher than the regional average and the 16th 
highest nationally. 
Blackpool had twice the proportion of private rented housing compared with the north west as a 
whole, 71 per cent of the housing stock was owner occupied, 7.8 per cent local authority (which was 
now managed by Blackpool Coastal Housing, an Arms Length Management Organisation),  
1.9 per cent housing association and 16.3 per cent private rented. The growth of the private rented 
sector had been driven by market failure in the small hotel and guesthouse sector where properties 
formerly used as holiday accommodation were converted into flats and bedsits for Multiple 
Occupation. It was estimated that Blackpool had between 4,000 and 6,000 Houses in Multiple 
Occupation. The town also had a large transient population which moved both within Blackpool and 
between the town and neighbouring local authority areas. 
A.3.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
Crime rates had fallen in Blackpool in recent years but overall the town had a much higher rate than 
the national average (38.83 per 1,000 population compared with 20.62 nationally). Violent crime 
rates (often fuelled by alcohol) were particularly high. 
Blackpool’s Crime Disorder and Drugs Strategy 2005-2008 reported that 46 per cent of respondents 
felt that their quality of life was negatively affected by crime compared to 36 per cent nationally. 
The issues of greatest concern to local residents included groups of youths ‘hanging around’ and 
in particular young people using drugs. However, the majority of complaints made by residents 
to the council were environment-related (i.e. graffiti and litter). A Citizen’s Panel convened as part 
of the Crime, Disorder and Drugs audit highlighted the following key issues and areas of concern 
to residents of Blackpool: vandalism to property (26 per cent), general crime levels (24 per cent), 
nuisance neighbours (20 per cent) and deliberate fire setting on or to property (17 per cent).  
The main type of anti-social behaviour impacting on the work of the Blackpool Coastal Housing  
Anti-social Behaviour team was noise and neighbour disputes. 
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A.3.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures 
The Blackpool Community Safety and Drugs Partnership was established in 2004 following the 
merger of the Blackpool Community Safety Partnership and the Blackpool Drug Action Team. 
The responsible authorities were Blackpool Borough Council, Blackpool Primary Health Care Trust, 
Lancashire Constabulary (Western Division), Lancashire Police Authority and Lancashire Fire and 
Rescue Services (Blackpool). The Partnership’s anti-social behaviour co-ordinator was based within 
Blackpool Borough Council. Three strategic themes formed the basis of Blackpool’s response 
to anti-social behaviour: prevention, enforcement and co-ordination. In 2006, Blackpool was 
awarded Respect Action Area status and was therefore committed to: establishing a FIP; providing 
more parenting classes for parents; facilitating ‘Face the People’ sessions where the police, local 
authorities and others could be accountable to the local public; keeping up its ‘relentless action’ 
to tackle anti-social behaviour by using the full range of tools and powers available, and using the 
Respect Housing Standard to prevent and deal with any problems in social housing. The three-
year Blackpool Community Safety and Drugs Partnership Plan 2008-2011 replaced the previous 
Anti-social Behaviour and Crime and Drug Disorder strategies. The Community Safety and Drugs 
Partnership Plan was subject to annual updating based on a strategic assessments. 
Responsibility for the management of anti-social behaviour in Council housing was transferred to 
the Blackpool Coastal Housing anti-social behaviour team. Blackpool Coastal Housing’s policy was 
to identify any problems that could lead to anti-social behaviour (for example, unmet support 
needs) from the very start of a tenancy. A housing officer explained the tenancy agreement and the 
consequences of any breaches in detail to the new tenant and identified any support needs at sign 
up. A follow up ‘welcome visit’ was made within six weeks of the start of a tenancy to check that the 
new tenant was managing. Anti-social behaviour complaints were initially dealt with by a housing 
officer who decided the appropriate action and support. 
If perpetrators continued to be involved in anti-social behaviour after referral to other agencies 
(e.g. environmental health or support providers) then the case could be referred to the Anti-social 
Behaviour co-ordinator and, if necessary, a multi-agency case conference would be convened to 
identify required actions and support. Blackpool Coastal Housing’s anti-social behaviour team would 
normally deal in-house with single person households and families without children. 
Most anti-social behaviour problems were resolved at an early stage and before any legal actions 
were necessary. There was some confusion among local stakeholders about the exact number of 
evictions for anti-social behaviour but there were thought to be very few. Stakeholders stressed that 
they adhered to Respect guidelines and that their aim was to try to support people and tackle their 
anti-social behaviour without recourse to eviction which was seen as a failure, but would be used if 
absolutely necessary. It was reported that other private and social rented landlords tended not to 
evicted on the grounds of anti-social behaviour, for a range of reasons. 
Blackpool had a range of initiatives and interventions to prevent and tackle anti-social behaviour 
including security patrols, ‘Talking CCTV’, mediation services; a FIP; expert parenting practitioners, 
youth diversionary activities; a project working with young people and parents; an integrated 
Youth Service providing a team of outreach workers (e.g. teenage pregnancy and drug and alcohol 
workers) and a service for young ex-offenders. In addition, locally based Reassurance Plus initiatives 
were in place in areas with the highest levels of anti-social behaviour and crime. Respondents also 
felt that Blackpool had sufficient generic support services apart from alcohol services but there 
were plans to develop more of these. Multi-agency and partnership working was described as being 
‘above average’. 
Appendices – Further information about the pilot localities
38
A.4 Dover District Council
A.4.1 Population and housing
Situated in east Kent, the Dover district borders Canterbury, Thanet and Shepway and covers an 
area of 121 square miles. Approximately two-thirds of the district’s population of 104,700 live in the 
urban areas of Dover and Deal. The remaining third live in the market town of Sandwich and the 
numerous settlements found in the district’s large rural hinterland. Dover is one of the south east’s 
less diverse large towns, with only four per cent of its residents being from Black and Minority Ethnic 
backgrounds.
The local Dover economy was perceived as being less dynamic than other parts of Kent. In addition 
to having three wards amongst the most deprived ten per cent in England, a further five were 
amongst the 20 per cent most deprived. Employment was largely dependent upon the service 
industries and average earnings within the district were low relative to regional and national 
averages. 
The Dover district had 46,000 homes, of which 72 per cent were owner-occupied, 11 per cent rented 
from the council and four per cent rented from a registered social landlord. In common with many 
of the coastal areas in the south east, the Dover district had a larger than average private rented 
sector, comprising 13 per cent of the housing stock. Sixty-nine per cent of privately rented homes 
were built pre-1919 and a third of the private rented accommodation was unfit. The majority of 
private rented homes were located in the urban centres of Dover and Deal. Rent levels and type of 
accommodation varied by area with the poorer quality accommodation concentrated in the more 
deprived wards in Dover. The private rented sector included 750 Houses in Multiple Occupation 
which were concentrated in areas of older unimproved housing, low property prices and deprivation. 
Dover’s lower skill and lower wage economy was reflected in the average house prices for the district 
being significantly less than other areas of England. But for many people, affordability was still a 
significant barrier to owner-occupation. 
The council remained the major social landlord in the district, with just under 5,000 homes. The 
majority were located in Dover and Deal although over 1,700 were located in rural areas. Demand 
for affordable housing far exceeded supply. The East Kent Triangle (Canterbury, Dover and Thanet) 
had five preferred partner registered social landlords, each of which had signed a five year protocol 
for joint working which was developed in consultation with the Housing Corporation and the 
Government Office for the South East. 
A.4.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
Dover had a significantly lower rate of crime that the national average for England and Wales and 
a low crime rate compared with Kent and the south east region as a whole. Dover’s Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Strategy 2005-2009 detailed a range of anti-social behaviour and criminal acts 
such as burglary and violence against the person. The problems of most concern to respondents to 
the Dover Fear of Crime Survey (2004) were loud or fast cars or motorbikes (28.4 per cent), followed 
by rubbish and litter (23.8 per cent) and ‘young people hanging around’ (21.4 per cent). The most 
prevalent reasons for feeling unsafe related to anti social behaviour, followed by alcohol and then 
issues such as poor lighting and speeding traffic. Local stakeholders described the main types of 
anti-social behaviour that they had to deal with as youth nuisance, alcohol and drug misuse and 
neighbour disputes. 
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A.4.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures 
The Dover Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership had a number of sub-groups which included the 
multi-agency Dover Anti-social Behaviour Action Group, which focused on individuals and families 
involved in, and geographic areas suffering from, anti-social behaviour and aimed to prevent and 
deter identified individuals from offending. The group was made up of representatives from Dover 
District Council’s Community Safety Unit and Housing department as well as representatives from 
the Council’s Children’s, Social Work, Youth and Community and Education Services departments, 
the police, Fire and Rescue Services, Port of Dover Police, a representative of local registered social 
landlords, the Primary Care Trust, the Youth Offending Team, Community Wardens and Connexions. 
The group had attempted to recruit a representative from the local voluntary sector. The Dover Anti-
social Behaviour Unit was founded in 2004 at the same time as Dover was designated a TOGETHER 
Anti-social Behaviour action area. The Community Safety and Anti-social Behaviour manager was 
based in the Anti-social Behaviour Unit in Dover District Council Offices. Dover’s approach to tackling 
anti-social behaviour embraced prevention, education and enforcement.
There had been no recent evictions for anti-social behaviour in Dover and this was attributed to the 
success of alternative interventions including the provision of support and warnings, Acceptable 
Behaviour Agreements and the use of ASBOs. However, local stakeholders also reported reluctance 
by landlords, including the Council, to evict on grounds of anti-social behaviour. 
Low level anti-social behaviour was normally dealt with in-house by the relevant social landlord’s 
housing and anti-social behaviour officers but more serious cases were referred to the Anti-social 
Behaviour Unit and, where appropriate, to Dover Anti-social Behaviour Action Group. Dover had 
a range of interventions designed to tackle anti-social behaviour. These were provided by Dover 
District Council and through partnership working with the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership 
and Dover Anti-social Behaviour Action Group. Interventions included diversionary activities and 
projects for young people including a scheme for children aged 8 to 13, funded with Respect money; 
parenting classes; drug and alcohol education and services; mediation services; and work with 
excluded children. Dover did not have a specialist FIP but the Council ran a parenting project and 
there were family support projects run by voluntary sector agencies in the district.
A.5 Manchester City Council
A.5.1 Population and housing
Manchester is a very diverse and rapidly changing city, with dynamic and differentiated housing 
markets. Although areas of the city had suffered from considerable low demand problems, the city 
centre and the south of the city had experienced significant price increases and increases were also 
occurring in private sector rent levels in the north and east of Manchester. Housing affordability was 
therefore a major concern, and the availability and pricing of rented accommodation had made it 
increasingly difficult for HB recipients and homeless applicants to find housing (in addition to making 
the assessment and administration of HB challenging). There were 7,010 homeless applications 
made to Manchester City Council in 2003/04.  
Manchester was one of the most deprived local authority areas in England, with an unemployment 
rate twice the national average. An estimated 70 per cent of Manchester City Council tenants and 60 
per cent of registered social landlord tenants were in receipt of HB. Manchester’s population included 
above national average proportions of singe person households, lone teenage parent households 
and 16-24 year olds. 
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Figures provided by the Office of National Statistics for April 2005 indicated that 20 per cent of 
Manchester’s 201,132 dwellings were local authority stock, with 15.7 per cent registered social 
landlord stock. A series of approximately 20 partial council stock transfers had occurred over the 
last decade and there was a continuing rolling programme of transfers, for example in recent years 
stock in the south of the city had been transferred to Willow Park Housing Trust, Southway Housing 
Trust and Parkway Green Housing Trust. A large area of the north of Manchester was covered by 
Northwards Arms Length Management Organisation. There were also housing-related Private 
Finance Initiatives. These stock transfers, combined with retained council directly-managed stock, 
a large number of other registered social landlords and private landlords, created a context in 
Manchester of a very complex and diffuse rented housing sector.
A.5.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
Manchester had some of the highest rates of recorded crime in England, with a strong correlation 
between wards experiencing higher rates of crime and deprivation. Research underpinning the 
development of the Manchester Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2005-2008 found that, 
although perceptions of the levels of anti-social behaviour had stabilised and recorded levels of 
youth nuisance had fallen in recent years, residents identified vandalism, youth nuisance and 
littering as key concerns. A survey in 2004 found that 31 per cent of respondents reported that  
anti-social neighbours were a problem (almost identical to the 32 per cent in 2001). 
A.5.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures
Manchester City Council had been awarded ‘trailblazer’ status by central government in recognition 
of its approach to tackling anti-social behaviour. The council had 6,400 successful legal actions 
(excluding possession notices) in relation to anti-social behaviour and has secured over 650 ASBOs. 
The council used the full range of anti-social behaviour powers, including Dispersal Orders and 
Parenting Orders. 
The Antisocial Behaviour Theme Group within the Manchester Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnership was chaired by Manchester City Council’s Housing Department. The group coordinated 
multi-agency responses to anti-social behaviour across the city. Part of the Trailblazer approach had 
been the development of Area Casework Panels which were local multi-agency groups addressing 
the complex needs of individuals and families engaged in anti-social behaviour. Manchester 
City Council had an Anti-social Behaviour Action Team which led the management of anti-social 
behaviour in the city. Cases involving families were addressed through the Tenancy Support Plus 
Service which is an intensive FIP. Cases needing less intensive housing related support were referred 
to the Council’s Housing Support Service, which worked with families, couples and single people.  
The council also had a Tenancy Compliance Team working with serious offenders and primarily 
single people. 
The Tenancy Support Plus service operated on a city-wide basis and received referrals from a range 
of agencies, including the council’s local housing teams, registered social landlords and Connexions. 
The service worked with families with a history of anti-social behaviour and high support needs 
who were often at risk of losing their tenancy and the service worked closely with the council’s 
homelessness services. Referrals also came through the Area Case work panels and the Tenancy 
Support Plus Service had an officer from their team attending each of these monthly meetings in all 
three police divisions sitting across the city. The cases referred to the Panels involved families and 
individuals who were causing anti-social behaviour in their neighbourhood and where holistic, twin-
track interventions of enforcement and support may reduce risk. The Tenancy Support Plus Service 
had 11 officers (one being job share) after recently recruiting three new officers. The service was 
funded to work with 42 families and also referred families to other services and agencies. 
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Manchester City Council had developed a Respect Standard charter for housing management in 
Manchester which had been signed by 30 registered social landlords operating in the city. Each of 
these partner landlords had a nominated Respect ‘champion’ to promote the standard in their own 
organisation and to provide a link into city-wide anti-social behaviour strategies and procedures. The 
Council offered the services of its Anti-Social Behaviour Action Team to other landlords in the city on 
a commercial basis. The council also offered a cross-tenure first-call service to all residents including 
those in owner-occupied and private rented properties. 
A.6 New Forest District Council
A.6.1 Population and housing
New Forest district covers an area of 290 square miles in south west Hampshire, and is dominated 
by the New Forest itself. The District had a population of approximately 170,000 people (72,000 
households) according to the 2001 Census and is predominantly rural. There had been a marked 
change in the age structure of the population over recent years with the proportion of residents 
under 16 years old decreasing and those over 60 increasing. The majority of the population lived in 
the seven principal towns located around the periphery of the New Forest: Fawley, Hythe, Totton, 
Lymington, New Milton, Fordingbridge and Ringwood. 
In the past thirty years the district had witnessed a huge increase in the number of houses built, 
the majority of which have been for owner occupation. As a result, privately owned homes had 
increased from 68 per cent of dwellings in 1991 to just over 80 per cent in 2001, whilst the number 
of council homes had fallen from 15 per cent to seven per cent, considerably below the national 
average. Private rented accommodation accounted for six per cent of dwellings. There were around 
5,200 council homes and 2,800 registered social landlord properties. An increasing affordability gap 
between house prices and incomes meant that households who would not historically have done so 
were now seeking to access social housing due to being priced out of the owner occupation market. 
New Forest District Council managed a Choice Based Letting system to allocate their housing stock 
with the aim of developing more mixed communities and encouraging sustainability.
In 2006/07 there were on average 6,923 HB claimants per quarter. The majority of these claimants 
lived in Council housing, but the numbers in this sector were decreasing, while a growing proportion 
of claimants were now living in the private rented sector. The Council’s Tax and HBs Service was 
rated in the top performing quartile nationally. 
A.6.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
The Council’s Housing Service Policy and Procedures stated that: ‘within the New Forest the majority 
of anti-social behaviour cases reported are of a relatively minor nature’, a view that was reflected 
by local stakeholders. While there was a recognition that anti-social behaviour problems occurring 
in the New Forest were not comparable to the more serious problems that occur elsewhere and 
particularly in larger urban areas, stakeholders identified ‘pockets’ within the New Forest where 
problems were more frequent and persistent. The most common reports of anti-social behaviour 
that the council dealt with involved groups of young people, noise and family feuds. The latter were 
said to commonly occur within gypsy and traveller communities that had an established presence 
in the area. In recent years, there was thought to have been an increase in anti-social behaviour 
involving young people and anti-social behaviour linked to drug and alcohol misuse. Approximately 
60 per cent of reported anti-social behaviour cases involved adults and 40 per cent young people.
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Figures provided in New Forest Community Safety Strategy 2005-2008 showed a range of numbers 
of anti-social behaviour incidents in each of the police sectors in 2005 from 818 in Ringwood to 
1,394 in Hythe. The consultation exercise that informed the strategy indicated that 16 per cent 
of respondents had experienced anti-social behaviour in the previous year, with 7.1 per cent 
experiencing anti-social behaviour on more than one occasion.
Despite recognising that anti-social behaviour problems in the New Forest were not on the scale of 
those that occur elsewhere in the UK, dealing effectively with the anti-social behaviour problems 
that were prevalent in the district was a key priority for New Forest District Council. Indeed, the 
council established dedicated anti-social behaviour officers ten years ago, one of the first local 
authorities in England to do so. 
A.6.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures 
One aim of The New Forest Community Safety Strategy 2005-2008 was to reduce the impact of 
the most serious instances of reported anti social behaviour incidents in the community. Individual 
objectives of the strategy included targeted individuals responsible for anti-social behaviour and 
modifying their behaviour through a co-ordinated partnership response; encouraging reporting of 
incidents between partners, providing targeted out of school hours diversionary activities for young 
people that enabled them to use their leisure time constructively and improving parenting skills 
for the guardians of individuals engaging in anti-social behaviour or at risk of engaging in low level 
crime.
Divided We Fall was the multi-agency partnership which sat under the overarching New Forest 
Community Safety Partnership and was tasked with identifying and tackling anti-social behaviour. 
The core group of the partnership consisted of New Forest District Council, the police, the Council’s 
Social Services department, Adolescent and Adult Mental Health Teams, the youth Offending 
Team, registered social landlords, the Youth Service, the Probation Service and Victim Support. The 
purpose of the group was to: facilitate the involvement of all relevant agencies in tackling anti-social 
behaviour, ensure effective information sharing processes are in place, agree a range of remedies, 
(including both early intervention and legal measures) to address anti-social behaviour, monitor 
the progress and effectiveness of Acceptable Behaviour Contracts and ASBOs, and implement local 
training programmes. 
The group had been pivotal in establishing joint working arrangements and information sharing 
agreements between partner agencies, together with protocols to facilitate the use of ASBOs and 
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts. Two dedicated anti-social behaviour co-ordinators (a social worker 
and police officer) were employed by the partnership to work with individuals identified as being 
engaged in anti-social behaviour. In addition to the core group, there were also local Divided We Fall 
groups operating in certain areas of the district. 
The Council’s Housing Services Anti-Social Behaviour Policy and Procedures had been designed to 
complement the strategic priorities of the Community Safety Strategy as well as New Forest District 
Council’s Housing Strategy. The Council’s Housing Department aimed to be a ‘centre of excellence’ 
in dealing effectively with anti-social behaviour and had signed up to the Respect Housing Standard. 
The Housing Department supported smaller registered social landlords who had less capacity to 
respond to anti-social behaviour problems, for example through the provision of a mediation service. 
Within the Housing Department, complaints were dealt with at an early stage internally by Housing 
Management officers, with mediation being used where appropriate. For social housing tenants, 
there were a range of support services in existence in the New Forest including floating housing 
support (to assist vulnerable tenants to maintain their tenancy), supported accommodation (for 
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those with higher level support needs) funded through Supporting People and provided by small 
specialist registered social landlords in the locality, as well as ‘Open Doors’ (a homelessness advice 
service). Applicants for tenant support needs were assessed by a supported housing panel.  
Non-tenure related support services were also available in the locality including parenting 
programmes, Connexions, Prison No Way (for young people at risk of offending) and ‘LIFE’ courses 
delivered by the Fire and Rescue service for vulnerable and ‘at risk’ young people, as well as a range 
of other diversionary activities for young people. New Forest did not have a FIP. It was reported by 
local stakeholders that the only gap in service provision was for families/individuals with chaotic 
lifestyles and complex needs.
More serious cases of anti-social behaviour or cases that have not been effectively resolved with 
less formal measures and which required an Acceptable Behaviour Contract or an ASBO were 
referred (by housing or other organisations) to the Community Safety Co-ordinator. The co-ordinator 
then pursued the case through the relevant local Divided We Fall partnership group, at which 
stage an action plan was agreed between partner agencies. New Forest District Council utilised 
a range of tenure and non-tenure based sanctions as part of a graduated approach to tackling 
anti-social behaviour. Only where less formal and supportive measures were deemed to have 
been unsuccessful or the anti-social behaviour was of a more serious nature, were legal measures 
pursued, including ASBOs, injunctions, demoted tenancies and possession proceedings. ASBOs were 
considered as a ‘last resort’ measure and 16 were in place in the New Forest (including CRASBOs). 
A.7 Newham London Borough Council
A.7.1 Population and housing
Newham is an Inner London Borough border with a total population of 246,200 in mid-2005. 
Newham was the least densely populated Inner London Borough (excluding the City of London) but 
its population and population density was anticipated to rise as current plans for redevelopment 
progress. Newham had the highest proportion of non-White ethnic groups in the country, with  
61 per cent of the population drawn from Mixed, Asian or Asian British, Black or Black British, Chinese 
or ‘Other’ ethnic groups.
According to the 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation Newham was the eleventh most deprived area 
in England and Wales and the fourth most deprived borough in London. This represented a slight 
improvement from the 2000 Index of Multiple Deprivation when Newham was ranked the fifth most 
deprived area in England and the third most deprived borough in London. The rate of economic 
activity of working age people in Newham was 65.9 per cent in 2005/06, lower than in both London 
(74.5 per cent) and England and Wales as a whole (78.3 per cent). Newham had the largest 
average household size (2.6 according to the 2001 Census), the highest proportion of households 
with dependent children aged 0-4 in England and Wales and the highest proportion of lone parent 
households. Newham also had the most workless households with dependent children in England 
and Wales. 
In 2006 there were 18,408 local authority dwellings, 11,524 registered social landlord homes, 115 
‘other’ public sector and 21,241 private rented sector dwellings. The rate of owner occupation  
(47 per cent) was comparatively low for London and much lower than the national average. 
Just over 11 per cent of dwellings in Newham were considered unfit with the majority of these 
dwellings in the private rented sector. There had been a significant improvement in the quality of 
local authority homes, with no properties being classified as unfit. The condition of private sector 
properties had also improved while there had been a significant increase in the number of unfit 
registered social landlord dwellings. Average house prices had more than doubled since 2000 
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compared to an increase of 73 per cent in London but average rent costs were cheaper in Newham 
than in London as a whole. In 2005-06 there were 25,000 households on the housing waiting list 
(ten per cent of the Borough’s population) and 5,000 in temporary accommodation. The total 
number of homeless households in need of temporary accommodation had increased while the 
number of households accepted as homeless and in priority need had fluctuated (between 1,495 
and 1,519) since 2000/01 and stood at 1,422 in 2005/06.
In 2005 Newham Council established an Arms Length Management Organisation Newham Homes, 
which took over the management, maintenance and improvement of Newham’s former council 
housing stock which comprised 23,013 properties (representing 91 per cent of Newham’s Council 
stock). Just over 17,000 of these were tenanted properties and the remainder were leasehold. The 
remainder of Newham’s council stock was managed by two Tenant Management Organisations and 
a Private Finance Initiative. Most of the housing stock (74 per cent) was flats.
A.7.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
The types of offences recorded by the Police included disturbance, community problems, 
drunkenness, noise nuisance and other unlisted disorder. In 2004/05 the Council received a total 
of 16,331 calls to the Anti-social Behaviour hotline, and increase of 7.4 per cent on 2004. Most 
calls came from a small number of hotspot areas in the borough. The most common type of anti-
social behaviour was fly tipping although noise nuisance was a significant problem and accounted 
for 5,549 complaints, an increase of 20 per cent from 2004/05. Local stakeholders explained that 
residents living on estates tended to complain about children playing football and ‘young people 
congregating’ at night. These young people may or may not have being doing anything wrong but 
local residents often felt intimidated by them. Stakeholders also identified more complex problems, 
including alcohol and drugs, domestic violence, mental health issues and disturbances caused by 
large numbers of visitors to some properties.       
A.7.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures
The Newham Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership comprised organisations including, amongst 
others, Newham Council, Newham Police, London Fire Brigade, Her Majesty’s Court Service, Youth 
Offending Team, Partnership for Victims and Vulnerable People and the Anti-Social Behaviour 
Partnership. The Anti-social Behaviour co-ordinator was based within the Community Safety Unit. 
Newham had a common anti-social behaviour service and respondents explained that the borough 
has a relatively large staff working on anti-social behaviour. Newham had a case work investigation 
team managed by an Interim Enforcement and Investigation manager. An information sharing 
protocol had been agreed between key stakeholders including the police, probation services, 
health authorities and registered social landlords. A variety of organisations have signed up to the 
scheme, including the police, probation services, health authorities and registered social landlords 
associations. The protocol provides partners with a legal framework and a common standard for 
sharing information. 
Complaints about anti-social behaviour from or about Newham Homes’ tenants were dealt with 
initially by front line housing officers who completed an initial anti-social behaviour incident 
form and investigated the case, which involved interviews with the complainant and alleged 
perpetrator/s. If the behaviour continued housing officer consulted with managers about 
further action. Serious cases which required enforcement action were dealt with by the Interim 
Enforcement and Investigation manager in the Crime and Anti-social Behaviour Service, who 
reviewed cases monthly to ensure that they were dealt with quickly. Newham had an ASBO panel 
and held case panels in eviction cases if the household was deemed to be vulnerable (e.g. where 
Appendices – Further information about the pilot localities
45
there were children or mental health issues). Newham used Injunctions but there were few evictions 
for anti-social behaviour as many anti-social tenants were actually evicted for rent arrears. More 
single people were evicted for anti-social behaviour than families but the Crime and Anti-social 
Behaviour Service attempted to intervene and support tenants before the Possession stage. 
Some registered social landlords in the borough had their own anti-social behaviour teams whilst 
others were more reliant on the council. Landlords did attempt to provide supportive interventions 
for tenants, but would use evictions on the grounds of anti-social behaviour if necessary. Newham 
had a number of support services such as youth programmes and a Family Support Project but there 
were no specific anti-social behaviour rehabilitation services for single adults and it was extremely 
difficult to access other services such as mental health, drug and alcohol agencies. The demand for 
services was very high and very few perpetrators of anti-social behaviour would meet all the criteria 
for support.
A.8 South Gloucestershire Council
A.8.1 Housing and population
South Gloucestershire is a mixed urban and rural local authority. The area includes urban 
communities, market towns and small villages and has experienced considerable population growth 
and new residential development. Over half of the districts’ population reside in the urban areas 
adjoining Bristol and a further 19 per cent live in the towns of Yate, Chipping Sodbury and Thornbury. 
The district was ranked about 300th out of 534 in the English Indices of Deprivation, there were no 
neighbourhoods in South Gloucestershire ranked in the most deprived 20 per cent in England and 
the district’s unemployment rate is considerably below regional and national averages. The Black 
and Minority Ethnic population of South Gloucestershire is 2.4 per cent, and is primarily located in 
the urban areas of the district. 
Research underpinning the South Gloucestershire Council Housing Strategy 2004-2009 identified 
problems of housing affordability, accessing owner occupation and the lack of social housing in the 
district. There were a total of 103,555 total dwellings in the district in April 2003 of which 84,562 
were in owner occupation. A 2003 housing needs study found that the cost of purchasing a home in 
the private sector was very high and that there had been an average 90 per cent increase in house 
prices between 1999 and 2003. The private rented sector comprised only 4.2 per cent of the housing 
stock, scattered across the district and private sector rent levels were high. 
There were 8,099 local authority dwellings in April 2003 and 2,407 registered social landlord 
dwellings. Turnover in the social rented sector was low and there was no major problem with vacant 
properties or re-letting. There were 5,159 applicants on the housing register in May 2003, including 
576 current homelessness cases. The 2004-2009 Housing Strategy estimated an annual increase 
of applicants on the register of 240. In February 2007 South Gloucestershire Council transferred its 
stock to the newly established Merlin Housing Society. Merlin is the district’s largest social housing 
provider, with over 8,000 properties. Merlin manages a number of hostels that may accommodate 
individuals who have been evicted from previous tenancies. The 2004-2009 Housing Strategy 
identified a further 24 registered social landlords with properties in the district. 
Each year the council accepted 500-550 applicants as homeless, with lone women with children 
comprising 45 per cent of these applications. There were increasing numbers of people with 
drug and alcohol dependency problems being accepted as homeless and the main causes of 
homelessness had been identified as parental/family eviction (21.7 per cent) and loss of assured 
short hold tenancies (17.9 per cent). 
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A.8.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
An audit of crime, disorder and drugs revealed that South Gloucestershire had some of the lowest 
crime rates, both regionally and nationally. A 2002-2004 audit estimated that anti-social behaviour 
cost South Gloucestershire approximately £11.3m per annum. The audit suggested that many 
offenders were young males aged between 16-19, including those who lived outside the district. A 
survey undertaken during this audit of approximately 1,000 respondents revealed that addressing 
anti-social behaviour was the top priority, cited by 71 per cent of respondents. 
Twenty-eight out of the 35 wards in the district recorded a reduction in recorded crime between 
2001 and 2004. During this period, there was a significant decrease (15 per cent) in the number of 
people reporting feeling unsafe at night. Reducing local disorder and anti-social behaviour was a 
priority theme of the 2005-2008 Crime, Disorder, Drugs and Alcohol Misuse Reduction Strategy and 
was the number one strategic priority for the Police District.
A.8.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structures
The Community Safety Partnership and Drugs Action Team had been merged into a single 
Community Safety and Drugs Partnership. A dedicated Anti-social Behaviour co-ordinator has been 
appointed to lead the South Gloucestershire Anti-social Behaviour Team and to co-ordinate the 
response of all council departments, the police and other anti-social behaviour strategy partner 
agencies and organisations. The South Gloucestershire Anti-social Behaviour Team included the  
co-ordinator, a dedicated police officer, two early intervention officers, a Court Officer, Criminal 
Damage Officer and a part-time Legal Officer. In addition to this, the Fire and Rescue Service had 
dedicated an officer to the team on a part-time basis. Early intervention was prioritised in the  
anti-social behaviour and community safety strategies. 
Since the appointment of the anti-social behaviour co-ordinator, the 2005-2008 Crime, Disorder, 
Drugs and Alcohol Misuse Reduction Strategy and Safer South Gloucestershire’s Annual Reports 
reported that 48 Acceptable Behaviour Contracts were signed and seven ASBOs were obtained 
in 2005. Two premises were closed due to drug dealing, using new legislation on drugs-related 
property closures. In 2006, 32 Acceptable Behaviour Contracts were signed, eight ASBOs were 
obtained and four Dispersal Orders were implemented. In 2007, 84 Acceptable Behaviour Contracts 
were signed, 13 ASBOs were granted, three Dispersal Orders implemented and one Closure Order 
granted. 
A multi-agency Anti-social Behaviour Review Panel was established to co-ordinate action on specific 
cases, along with the use of individual case conferences to address the most serious, protracted 
or complex cases of anti-social behaviour. In 2005, 74 cases were referred to the Panel, with 68 
referrals made in 2006 and 79 in 2007. The Anti-Social Behaviour Review Panel Team’s membership 
included representatives of the Council’s Legal, Community Care, Children and Young People, 
Education and Environmental and Health Services departments, the Fire and Rescue Service, the 
police, Merlin Housing Society and the Youth Offending Team. Any agency could refer a case to 
the panel. The case would be reviewed and, if appropriate, an action plan would be developed to 
address a wide range of issues, such as truancy from school or the need for further social services 
support. Each case remained with the panel and was subject to regular review, with agencies 
accountable for the actions that they took. If the case was not resolved a further multi-agency case 
conference would be held. Twenty-five such case conferences were held in 2006. There was also a 
panel overseeing Common Assessment Frameworks. If there was a subsequent need (for example 
because of a lack of engagement by individuals with support services) then the case would be 
referred on to the Anti-social Behaviour Review Panel.
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An anti-social behaviour practitioner’s tool kit and guide had been developed and disseminated 
to police, housing staff and other relevant agencies. A specialist anti-social behaviour database 
(Flare) recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour for the Safer South Gloucestershire Partnership, 
and was used for case management and hotspot analysis and interventions. Anti-social behaviour 
initiatives had been widely publicised in the district, including the production of newsletters for local 
communities experiencing higher levels of anti-social behaviour. 
Merlin Housing Society had created a dedicated anti-social behaviour team, comprising a manager, 
two anti-social behaviour officers and a solicitor. The team co-ordinated the anti-social behaviour 
work of Merlin’s area housing offices. Since its establishment the team had two obtained injunctions 
against individuals. Merlin Housing Society’s anti-social behaviour manager had been fully involved 
in the development of the HB sanction pilot scheme. 
A tiered response was utilised to tackle complaints about anti-social behaviour in South 
Gloucestershire. Complaints and police data were collated, and where necessary, a first and then 
second early warning letter were issued. If required, a visit to the alleged perpetrator was then 
conducted. If the case was still not resolved then some further action, such as an Acceptable 
Behaviour Contract, was considered. If this further action did not resolve the case then it was be 
referred to the Anti-social Behaviour Review Panel where enforcement action and/or referral to 
further support services were explored. Early intervention and multi-agency working were key 
themes of the approach to tackling anti-social behaviour in South Gloucestershire. For example, 
there was a rule that Acceptable Behaviour Contracts must involve at least two agencies. 
A.9 Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council
A.9.1 Population and housing
Wirral is a Metropolitan Borough with a population of 313,000. It originally developed as an 
engineering and manufacturing area but the decline in these traditional industries created 
significant pockets of social deprivation with unemployment in the borough above national 
averages. In 2004 (using Wirral’s former ward boundaries), Bidston, Birkenhead, Leasowe, Seacombe 
and Tranmere were within the five per cent of most deprived wards in England. The borough 
comprises a variety of neighbourhoods, ranging from these more disadvantaged communities 
to areas of affluence, giving rise to a diverse and polarised housing market. Neighbourhoods in 
the west of Wirral had experienced rapid house price increases to the extent where affordability 
problems had emerged. This contrasted with the neighbourhoods in Wirral’s main urban areas on its 
eastern coast where housing market decline was clearly evident. 
The size of the housing stock across the borough was significantly lower than in most Merseyside 
authorities, with a total of 143,422 properties located in Wirral. Social housing accounted for  
15.5 per cent (22,258) of the total housing stock, compared to the average for Merseyside of 24 per 
cent and 21 per cent for the North-West region. There were 118,526 private sector properties of 
which around ten per cent were privately rented, with a high proportion of this sector located within 
the inner area of Wirral. Wirral had the highest rates of intentional homelessness in the North-West, 
although most of this was not classified as being related to anti-social behaviour, partly because 
anti-social behaviour issues were less likely to be identified in cases involving private landlords. 
Since 1991, the overall stock of social housing has fallen by 12 per cent, partly as a result of the 
council’s active demolition programme to tackle poor quality and/or low demand accommodation. 
Following stock transfer, former council properties are now owned and managed by Wirral 
Partnership Homes and Beechwood and Ballantyne Community Housing Association. These two 
registered social landlords now manage approximately 14,500 properties throughout Wirral. 
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A.9.2 Types and extent of anti-social behaviour problems
One aim of the Wirral Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy 2005-2008 was to ‘reduce anti-
social behaviour in all its forms’. Underpinning this are seven targets: As at December 2007, Wirral 
had demonstrated a reduction in anti-social behaviour reported by all agencies and all measures, 
including 95 per cent of referred anti-social behaviour cases being resolved by a cessation or 
satisfactory reduction of the anti-social behaviour, a 15 per cent reduction in anti-social behaviour 
involving young people since 2003-04 and surveys indicating that respondents perceived youth 
disorder to have reduced and 98 per cent of respondents feeling ‘safe’ or ‘very safe.’
A.9.3 Anti-social Behaviour Management Structure
Wirral Anti-Social Behaviour Team was the dedicated multi-disciplinary service tasked with 
tackling anti-social behaviour in the borough and focused its work upon the themes of prevention, 
enforcement and resettlement. The team is part of the Joint Community Safety Team, the delivery 
arm of Wirral’s Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership. It was created in January 1998, initially 
to take enforcement action against the perpetrators of serious or persistent nuisance related to 
council properties and was formerly known as the Neighbour Nuisance Team. In July 2003, the team 
expanded into the private sector and began to deal with anti-social behaviour related to owner-
occupied and privately rented properties. In early 2006 the team’s remit further expanded to focus 
not only upon enforcement, but also preventative and resettlement work. The team had 27 staff 
members, comprising officers from the Council’s Regeneration Department, Education Services, 
Social Welfare Services and Youth Services and seconded officers from Merseyside Police, Merseyside 
Fire and Rescue Service and Family Support Unit, supported by a dedicated Community Safety 
solicitor.
Complaints relating to anti-social behaviour occurring amongst properties managed by Wirral 
Partnership Homes and Beechwood and Ballantyne Community Housing Association were, in the 
first instance, made directly to a local area housing office after which a warning may be issued or 
referral to mediation made. More serious cases occurring in properties managed by both landlords 
were referred to the Wirral Anti-Social Behaviour Team for further investigation and enforcement 
action, where appropriate. 
Eighteen registered social landlords in Wirral had signed up to the Respect Standard for Housing 
Management as part of a Wirral Consortium. The consortium of registered social landlords and 
Wirral Anti-Social Behaviour Team shared information and best practice relating to anti-social 
behaviour and sought to develop combined activities and initiatives. The consortium also aimed 
to provide support to smaller landlords with less resources available to them to tackle anti-social 
behaviour. Wirral Partnership Homes (through the Wirral Anti-Social Behaviour Team) always 
considered seeking an ASBO in cases where the eviction of a Wirral Partnership Homes’ tenant was 
being sought. This was to ensure that the new community to where the evicted tenant may move 
would have some protection in place should the individual’s anti-social behaviour continue. It was 
estimated that there were between 10-12 evictions a year, with the majority of these involving 
registered social landlords. 
Once a case (referred from either the social housing sector or directly from the private sector) had 
come to the attention of the Anti-social Behaviour Team, an initial assessment was made and 
if the case was accepted it was allocated to an anti-social behaviour enforcement officer who 
carried out an investigation and took appropriate action. Legal action would not usually be taken 
without first issuing the perpetrator with a warning, making a referral to another organisation if 
appropriate, or utilising mediation and/or an Acceptable Behaviour Contract. In cases where these 
tools failed to stop the anti-social behaviour or in serious cases (e.g. involving the threat of, or actual 
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use of violence) legal action would be considered. In all cases where the issuing of an Acceptable 
Behaviour Contract or an application for an ASBO was being considered, an anti-social behaviour 
case conference would be convened, involving representatives from relevant agencies. An anti-social 
behaviour case conference was used as a mechanism for drawing agencies together to consider 
other cases where a multi-agency input was required. 
Particular localities within Wirral were also designated as Anti-Social Behaviour Watch Schemes 
by the Director of Regeneration. Anti-Social Behaviour Watch Schemes included local lettings 
agreements (involving enhanced checks on housing applicants), signs designating the area as within 
a scheme, regular meetings between residents and agencies and encouraging residents to establish 
their own neighbourhood watch systems. 
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Appendix B 
Further information about the 
research participants
B.1 Blackburn with Darwen
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Co-ordinator,	Blackburn	with	Darwen	Community	Safety	Team.	
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Manager,	Twin	Valley	Homes	(a).
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Officers	(6),	Twin	Valley	Homes.
•	 Benefit	Client	Manager	and	Claims	Checker,	Customer	Services,	Blackburn	with	Darwen	Borough	
Council.
•	 Family	Intervention	Project	Manager,	NCH	(b).
•	 Head	of	Operations,	Children’s	Services	and	Social	Care,	Blackburn	with	Darwen	Borough	Council.
•	 Project	Development	Officer,	Housing	and	Neighbourhoods,	Blackburn	with	Darwen	Borough	
Council.
•	 Senior	Solicitor,	Legal	Services,	Blackburn	with	Darwen	Borough	Council.
B.2 Blackpool
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Co-ordinator,	Blackpool	Borough	Council.
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Manager,	Blackpool	Coastal	Housing.
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Officer,	Blackpool	Borough	Housing.
•	 Assistant	Director,	Assessment,	Prevention	and	Support,	Adult	Social	Care	and	Housing,	Blackpool	
Borough Council.
•	 Housing	Benefit	Manager,	Blackpool	Borough	Council.
B.3 Dover 
•	 Community	Safety	and	Anti-social	Behaviour	Manager,	Dover	District	Council.
•	 Head	of	Revenues,	Benefits	and	Customer	Services,	Dover	District	Council.
•	 District	Manager	for	Children’s	Social	Services	and	Chair	of	Dover	Anti-social	Behaviour	Action	
Group.
•	 Housing	Benefit	Manager,	Dover	District	Council.
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B.4 Manchester
•	 Deputy	Manager	for	Tenancy	Support	Plus,	Manchester	City	Council.	
•	 Head	of	Anti-social	Behaviour	Services,	Manchester	City	Council.
•	 Housing	Benefit	Manager,	Manchester	City	Council.
B.5 New Forest
•	 Assistant	Director	of	Environment	and	Health	(which	includes	Community	Safety)	New	Forest	
District Council.
•	 Head	of	Public	Health	and	Community	Safety,	New	Forest	District	Council.
•	 Assistant	Director	of	Housing,	New	Forest	District	Council.
•	 Estates	Manager,	New	Forest	District	Council.
•	 Housing	Manager,	New	Forest	District	Council.
•	 Senior	Neighbourhood	and	Tenancy	Management	Officer,	New	Forest	District	Council.
•	 Tax	and	Benefits	Manager,	New	Forest	District	Council.
B.6 Newham
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Co-ordinator,	Newham	London	Borough	Council.
B.7 South Gloucestershire
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Manager,	Merlin	Housing	Association	(c).
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Manager,	Safer	South	Gloucestershire.	
•	 Benefit	Service	Manager,	South	Gloucestershire	Council.
•	 Fraud,	Welfare	and	Visiting	Manager,	South	Gloucestershire	Council.
•	 Housing	Needs	Accommodation	Manager,	South	Gloucestershire	Council.
B.8 Wirral
•	 Wirral	Anti-social	Behaviour	Enforcement	Team	Officers	(3),	Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
•	 Anti-social	Behaviour	Team	Enforcement	Co-ordinator,	Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
•	 Anti-social	Team	Manager,	Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
•	 Family	Intervention	Project	Manager,	Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
•	 Homelessness	and	Re-housing	Manager,	Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
•	 Housing	Benefit	Co-ordinator,	Wirral	Metropolitan	Borough	Council.
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(a) Twin Valley Homes is the successor housing organisation managing the former local authority  
 housing stock in Blackburn with Darwen, following stock transfer.
(b) NCH is a children’s charity.
(c) Merlin Housing Society is the successor housing organisation managing the former local   
 authority housing stock in South Gloucestershire following stock transfer.
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